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Publisher’s Note
The 2013 Brigham Young University Prelaw Review (the “Journal”) continues to demonstrate Brigham Young University’s commitment to excellence in scholarship and student development.
Throughout this past year it has been a privilege to work with ambitious students who want to produce the best possible undergraduate
legal journal.
Continuing the vision of the Journal, this year’s staff has worked
arduously to present professional and current legal scholarship. As
undergraduates the depth and breadth of the topics addressed required that these students do much more than just editing. The authors and editors studied to find court cases and law review articles
to support their arguments. During the year, as new information
became available, authors and editors continually updated and refocused their arguments to provide timely discussions of the current
issues. Consequently, each of these articles reflects the latest decisions from the courts and scholarship from the legal community.
It is always the goal to produce a reputable legal journal. However, this experience also provides the opportunity for the staff to
prepare his or herself as members for future professional scholarship
and work in the legal field. Each student has become proficient in the
Bluebook system of legal citations and all have spent countless hours
editing and source checking each other’s legal articles. The students
have also learned to analyze pressing issues, incorporate legal citations, and present cogent legal arguments, while receiving training
in journal publishing. These students leave the 2013 edition of this
Journal possessing the ability to excel in law and other professional
pursuits.
We continue to be grateful for the endowment from the Rawlinson Family Foundation that funds the Journal and the support of
Brigham Young University’s resources to create and print this publication. As you read the topics addressed in this Journal, I’m sure
that you will agree that this is an impressive work produced by these
v

BYU undergraduate authors and editors. It continues to be a pleasure to work with such fine individuals and students on a daily basis.
Kris Tina Carlston, J.D., MBA
Director – Preprofessional Advisement Center
Prelaw Advisor
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Editor-in-Chief & Managing Editor’s Note
The 2013 edition of the BYU Prelaw Review reflects the diverse
array of salient legal and political issues of the past year. Its articles
address topics including drone strike policy, the Westboro protests,
and even contraceptive administration. The authors submitted their
first drafts in September 2012 and, with the help of a talented group
of editors, have continued to refine their articles for the past eight
months. This finished product is the culmination of countless hours
of work and dedication, and it represents a significant achievement
for all the students involved. Each student has grown intellectually
as a result of the rigorous process of writing, revising, and improving
their ideas and arguments.
We appreciate the hard work of both our authors and editors and
acknowledge the distinctive effort and contribution of each member
of our team. This year’s authors approached the task of academic
legal writing with a bold enthusiasm and ingenuity, reflected in their
high caliber articles. They managed their editors and listened to differing viewpoints with poise and respect. Congruently, our editors
challenged their groups and contributed significantly to the content
presented in each article. We have enjoyed the camaraderie of this
Prelaw Review team and are proud to have worked alongside such
talented, creative individuals.
We offer a special thanks to the leadership staff of this year’s
Prelaw Review. Jon Bird and Katherine Dew provided critical and
insightful feedback throughout the semester. In addition to their
substantive feedback, they provided valuable administrative and organizational assistance. Our lead editor, Andres Gonzalez always
brought energy and laughter to our team meetings. More importantly, he also provided perceptive commentary and made sure each
draft was successfully completed. Finally, we thank Laura Bean for
her amazing InDesign skills.
We also extend special appreciation to our advisor and publisher,
Kris Tina Carlston. Her insight and experience helped guide our devii

cisions and maintain the quality of this journal. We thank her for
supporting our team in the transformative process of publishing the
2012–2013 BYU Prelaw Review.
Brian Reed				Brooke Smith
Editor-in-Chief 				
Managing Editor

The Westboro Problem: The Abridgement of
the Right to Protest
Karl J. Worsham1

O

n March 10, 2006, the Westboro Baptist Church (Westboro)
picketed a military funeral in Westminster, Maryland. It
was the funeral of Matthew A. Snyder, a U.S. Marine Lance
Corporal, who had died in action seven days earlier on March 3,
2006.2 Albert Snyder, Lance Corporal Snyder’s father, sued Pastor
Fred Phelps and Westboro for defamation, intrusion upon seclusion,
publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional
distress and civil conspiracy.3 This was not Westboro’s first funeral
protest; it has been protesting for many years in order “to communicate its belief that God hates the United States for its tolerance of
homosexuality.”4 When Snyder’s case against Westboro came before
a jury it held Westboro liable for 10.9 million dollars in compensatory
and punitive damages. Westboro challenged the verdict, claiming
that it was grossly excessive, and sought judgment on the grounds
that the First Amendment fully protected its speech. The District
1

Karl is a senior studying Philosophy and graduates from Brigham Young
University in April 2013. He plans to attend law school in Fall 2014. Upon
completing of law school, Karl plans on pursuing a career in the public
or academic legal field with the long-term goal of working as a judge. He
thanks Ryan Awerkamp, Devynne Barret, David Crockett, Jordan Harvey,
and Taylor Smith, whose insights and recommendations were on point and
were appreciated second only to their hardwork and dedication. This paper
could not have come to full fruition without them.
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Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DoD Identifies Marine Casualty
(Mar. 6, 2006) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
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Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008).
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Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 1, 1 (2011).
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Court reduced the punitive damages awarded but left the verdict
otherwise intact. The verdict was again appealed and the Fourth Circuit Court reversed the jury’s ruling, concluding that, “Westboro’s
statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because
those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.”5
It was then appealed by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
which heard oral arguments on October 6, 2010, and on March 2,
2011 announced an 8-1 decision upholding the Fourth Circuit ruling
in favor of Westboro, affirming that Westboro’s statements were in
fact entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.6
The response from citizens, but more especially from legislatures around the country, was decisive. The people disagreed with
the courts that such protests should be permitted. At least twentynine states7 and the United States Congress had passed laws or have
broadened preexisting disorderly conduct laws to prohibit funeral
protests as of 2008.8 Since 2008, Arizona,9 Alaska,10 and California11
have also passed or begun the process to pass similar laws. All of
these laws have certain regulations in common; they all, to some extent, restrict when a funeral protest occurs, the distance a protest can
be held from the funeral, and have provisions prohibiting disruptive
behavior at a service.12
5

Id. at 2.

6

Id.

7

These states include: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin.
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Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn, 67 Md. L. Rev. 295, 316 (2008).
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S.B. 1101, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
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H.B. 234, 27th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2012).
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S.B. 661, 81st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
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There is no doubt that there seems to be a problem with the actions of Westboro. To protest a funeral, to use another’s death as
a platform for gaining national publicity for your personal views,
religious or otherwise, seems to be in direct conflict with accepted
guidelines of decency and decorum. Yet, there are few rights held so
sacrosanct for Americans as the Right of Assembly and the Right of
Expression as put forth in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.
This conflict between society’s view of decent and upright conduct
and basic constitutional rights will hereafter be referred to as the
“Westboro Problem.”
This article attempts to dissect this dilemma not by questioning
the ruling of the Supreme Court, but the constitutionality of the reactionary laws put forth by state and national legislatures. Section II will
discuss the precedent of the proper place, time, and manner of public
speech and protests and to what degree the courts have determined
that the government, federal or otherwise, may regulate such expression. Section III will delineate the contents of both state and federal
laws and explore them in light of the precedent discussed in section
II in order to determine their constitutionality. Section IV responds
to those who would expand rights to include a right to mourn13 or
expand the definition of the captive audience doctrine14 as a solution
to the Westboro Problem. Section V concludes by demonstrating that
the responses by state legislatures, as well as those calling for the
expansion of rights, are not in the best interest of the country. It will
then set forth two possible solutions to this complex issue.

I. Proper Place, Time, and Manner
The doctrine of proper place, time, and manner is set forth in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. In Clark, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Park Service, which prevented the
demonstrators from sleeping in symbolic tents to call attention to
the plight of the homeless. According to the court, the Park Service’s
13

Id.

14

Stephen Dent, Freeing the Captive: The Case for Expanding the Captive
Audience Doctrine, 25 BYU Pre. L. Rev. 35 (2011).

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 27, 2013

4

regulation did not violate the First Amendment as it (i) was justified
without reference to the content of the speech regulated, (ii) was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest,15 and
(iii) left open ample alternative channels for the communication of
the information.16 Justice Roberts said in Snyder that, “Westboro’s
choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the
Government’s regulatory reach—it is ‘subject to reasonable time,
place, or manner restrictions’ that are consistent with the standards
announced in this Court’s precedents [Clark].” Therefore, it is by this
same standard that the “Government’s regulatory” actions toward
Westboro should be considered.17
Applying this three-pronged doctrine to the Westboro funeral
picketing returns an interesting result. This doctrine dictates that
any law passed to prohibit the picketing of funerals, military or otherwise, must be content neutral. It cannot address the type or kind of
speech presented, but rather must deal solely with the place, time,
and manner of the demonstration. This may be difficult to determine, as the response to the Westboro picketing has been intense in
the rapidity and extent of the action taken. The law would have to be
worded carefully to object to the fact that such a protest is occurring
at a funeral and during a time of mourning and not to the kind of
epithets that are uttered there.
The law must also be tailored narrowly to advance a compelling
government interest. It would not be enough, for example, to say
that the law is in place to protect the protestors from the hearers of
their speech or to say that it is to maintain the peace. This would be
contrary to the regulation in the previous paragraph as it implies a
knowledge and condemnation of the content of the rhetoric. As with
the example of “fighting words” there are exceptions to this rule.18
However, in Snyder, Chief Justice Roberts addressed this very point
claiming that Westboro’s rhetoric does not fall under this classifi15

Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 288 (1984).

16

Id.

17

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 1, 11 (2011).

18

R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969).
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cation: “The ‘content’ of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad
issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of ‘purely
private concern.’”19 Speaking of the content of the signs themselves,
Justice Roberts continues, “While these messages may fall short of
refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight—
the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens,
the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import.”20 The
courts were clear that Westboro’s rhetoric was not considered an exceptional case and therefore must be treated as protected speech.
It appears that as long as Westboro protests events or issues of
national significance and does so peaceably its expression cannot
be abridged on account of a fear of violence as it could if they were
using fighting words. In fact, the protection of rights is one of the
government’s fundamental roles; therefore, if there were a threat of
violence to Westboro during its protests the government would have
a greater responsibility to Westboro and the protection of its right to
protest than to the hearers.21
The most difficult part of this doctrine for Westboro is whether
there are ample alternative channels for the communication of the
information. While it is true that Westboro could communicate this
information in other ways or at other events, there seems to be no
real substitute for the national media coverage they are receiving or
the price at which they are receiving it. On two occasions Westboro
decided not to protest in exchange for free airtime on the radio to
communicate its message.22 This demonstrates that Westboro’s funeral picketing is not done to protest the person who has died, but to
find the most effective channel through which it can promulgate its
message. The picketing is so controversial that it gets national media
coverage, and is therefore the most inexpensive way for Westboro
19

Snyder, 562 U.S. at 8.

20

Id.

21

The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).

22

‘Insane’ Picketers Cancel Amish Funeral Protest, The Age (Oct. 1, 2012,
2:16 PM), http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/insane-amish-protest-dr
opped/2006/10/05/1159641433255.html.
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to get its message to the largest number of people. While it is by no
means the responsibility of the government to provide groups, large
or small, with ample communication, it does not stand in a position
in which it can deny a group the channels of communication it presently utilizes so long as that group does so peaceably and in accordance with the doctrine of proper place, time, and manner.

II. Federal Versus State Reactionary Laws
The various states as well as the federal government have passed
anti-funeral picketing laws in response to Westboro. All of these
laws include similar statutes and regulations. As mentioned in the
introduction, all of them place time provisions that limit or stipulate the temporal distance between when the protests take place and
when the funerals start and end. They also include distance requirements as well as provisions prohibiting disturbances to the service
of behavior or noise. In the laws passed in Kansas,23 Delaware,24 and
Nebraska25 funeral picketing is prohibited within an hour before the
funeral and two hours following. Most of the states have set a restriction on picketing within 500 to 1,000 feet of the service while a few
have limited the distance to as little as 300.26 Another commonality
among all of these laws is that none of them make any distinctions
as to the kind of funeral; they hold for any and all funeral services.
The federal law, the “Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act”
(RAFH), includes similar time and distance restrictions: no protests
one hour before or after and 500 feet from the funeral, respectively.
The RAFH, along with the state laws, suggests that this law is enacted to protect the bereaved and mourning families.27 The major
23

Kan. Stat. Ann., ch. 21, art. 61, § 21-6106 (2012).

24

Del. Stat. Ann., ch. 5, tit. xi, § 1303 (2006).

25

Neb. Rev. Stat., ch. 28, § 28-1320.03 (2006).

26

Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free
Speech against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 md. l. rev.
295, Appendix (2008).

27

Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228, 120 Stat.
387, (2006).
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distinction between the RAFH and the state laws is that it specifies
the type of funeral, claiming only prohibitions on picketing the funeral service of veterans of the United States Armed Forces.28
If these laws, both federal and state, are viewed in light of the
doctrine of proper place, time, and manner, one can determine their
constitutionality. The Incorporation Doctrine indicates that the First
Amendment is binding not only to the federal government, but to the
states as well. Through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment
applies in its totality to the states.29 Therefore, with questions regarding the abridgement of rights set forth in the First Amendment, there
is no distinction between state and federal governments with respect
to their responsibility to their citizens or the doctrine that applies
to the protection of those rights. Therefore, the RAFH and the state
laws will both be evaluated using the same criteria.
(i) Content Neutral
To apply this doctrine, first, these laws are scrutinized to determine if they are content neutral. A law is content neutral if the
“restrictions on expression, whether oral or written or symbolized
by conduct, . . . are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.”30 The Kansas law prohibits, “engaging in a public
demonstration at any . . . entrance to any cemetery . . . or other location where a funeral is held or conducted, . . . knowingly obstructing,
hindering, [or] impeding . . . another person’s entry to or exit from
a funeral; or knowingly impeding vehicles which are part of a funeral procession.”31 Nebraska’s law prohibits, “[a] person . . . [from]
. . . picketing . . . one hour prior to through two hours following
the commencement of a funeral.”32 Finally, the RAFH prohibits, “a
28

Id.

29

Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925)

30

Clark, 468 U.S. at 288.

31

Kan. Stat. Ann. ch. 136, § 176 (2011).

32

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3 (2006).
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demonstration on the property of a cemetery under the control of the
National Cemetery Administration or on the property of Arlington
National Cemetery unless the demonstration has been approved by the
cemetery superintendent or the director of the property on which the
cemetery is located.”33 The other laws are all similarly worded. None
of them are directed at Westboro explicitly nor do they mention its
controversial rhetoric. By this measurement both the state and federal anti-funeral picketing laws appear to be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and should be considered
content neutral.
(ii) Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Compelling Government Interest
Second, the laws are scrutinized to determine whether they are
narrowly tailored to advance or serve a compelling government interest. As mentioned above, the state and federal laws differ in one
important respect: the federal law specifically prohibits the picketing
of military funerals, but the state laws prohibit any picketing of any
funeral. While they are clearly tailored differently, one cannot established whether each is sufficiently narrowly tailored without knowing the intent of the laws, i.e. the government interest that they are
seeking to serve or advance.
As was mentioned previously, both the federal and state laws
claim that the laws are to be enacted for the protection of the bereaved and mourning. While the protection of its citizens is of primary concern and a fundamental role of the government, that role
does not extend to the protection of feelings at the expense of First
Amendment rights.34 As of yet there is no statutory right to mourn
or to private bereavement that compels government intervention to
protect these rights. The case could be made, and was in Snyder, that
real emotional damage is done by funeral picketing. The topic of
emotional distress and damage was specifically addressed in Snyder
and there is little reason to believe that, inasmuch as the picketers,

33

H.R. 5037, 109th Cong. 2nd Session (2006) (enacted).

34

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2011).
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Westboro or otherwise, are addressing issues of national import, the
Court will overturn its previous decision.35
To establish a compelling interest, one balances the governmental interest against the constitutional right that is affected by the
law.36 While the government does have a responsibility to and an interest in the protection of the bereaved and mourning from emotional distress, if this responsibility is balanced against the protection of
a First Amendment right it is not held to be a compelling interest. It
appears that a law tailored to this end would not pass strict scrutiny.
However, a case can be made that the RAFH serves a compelling
government interest. It is the responsibility of the government to
maintain and provide for the national defense.37 The Federal Government does this in large part by maintaining a corps of military
personnel. The picketing of military funerals could adversely affect
recruiting and the morale of these soldiers. In this regard the prohibition of military funeral picketing serves and advances a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
While having this as the purpose of the RAFH would allow it to pass
this phase of strict scrutiny it should be noted that the maintenance
of a national defense is not the expressed purpose of the law. Such
a purpose would have to be inferred from its name or made in oral
arguments but could not ascertained from legislative intent alone.
(iii) Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
The final phase is to determine whether these laws leave open
ample alternative channels for the communication of the information. The implicit question here is whether ample implies comparative in quality or, simply, in quantity of other options. It is clear that
to remove funeral picketing as a form of communication will greatly
limit the protestor’s ability to communicate as widely, especially in
the case of Westboro. As a part of its controversial message and controversial choice of picketing location, Westboro receives an unprec35

Id.

36

Black’s Law Dictionary 300 (8th ed. 2007).

37

u.s.

Const. art. 1, § 8.
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edented amount of media coverage, which promulgates its message
all over the country. A law prohibiting this channel of communication
leaves Westboro with no comparative channel of communication. In
Ladue v. Gilleo, the Supreme Court ruled that the government could
not prohibit residents from placing signs in their yards or windows,
as there was not ample alternative channels of communication. The
concern was not that the residents could not communicate the same
words or ideas that were communicated through the signs but that
they could not do so with the same ease or in the same way.38 In this
regard, it appears that for the government to restrict Westboro from
picketing at funerals would remove the controversy that allows them
to get national media attention, and, in this way, would leave them
without ample alternative channels of communication.
After passing through strict scrutiny, it is clear that the state laws
are too broadly tailored and do not serve a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to warrant their existence. As to the RAFH
there is the possibility of an argument for the advancement of a compelling governmental interest but such an interest must be explicitly
expressed in the statute or be clearly ascertained from the legislative intent. In this case it is not, and without some modification the
RAFH would not pass the second phase of strict scrutiny. As to the
question of ample alternative channels of communication, both the
state and the federal laws appear to fail to give any alternative whatsoever. On these points both the state and federal laws fail to pass
strict scrutiny.

III. Rights Endangered Through Their Expansion
Other possible solutions to the Westboro Problem are the creation of new or the expansion of existing rights. In the Maryland Law
Review, not long after the passage of Maryland’s own anti-picketing
act, a plea was made to create a right to mourn.39 While the appeal to
38

Ladue v. Gilleo 512 U.S. 43 (1994)

39

Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free
Speech against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 Md. L. Rev.
295, 304 (2008).
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the sentiments seems to indeed call for an expansion of rights to protect the hearer from the speaker, reason appears to dictate a different
course. The First Amendment protects the rights of the speaker and
the expansion of the hearer’s right through the creation of a right
to mourn would necessarily abridge the right of the former.40 The
captive-audience doctrine exists for this very purpose. If there is
a situation in which a hearer cannot, as a practical matter, remove
himself from the intrusive speech of the speaker then Freedom of
Speech can be circumscribed.41 It is true that there are cases in which
the courts interpret the law an in doing so create judicial doctrine;42
this by no means signifies that it is within the judiciary’s purview to
create rights. Rather, they are to determine whether and where a law
infringes on those rights already granted.
A similar argument was made that claimed that the Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to expand the definition of the captiveaudience doctrine, that the captive-audience doctrine has been assessed too sparingly, and that the only way to balance the rights of
the hearers with the rights of the speaker is to expand the definition of a captive audience.43 While this argument appears compelling on the surface it does not consider the precedent that would be
established if the captive-audience doctrine was expanded to include
further unwanted speech. One not only has to make sure that she is
in line with proper place, time, and manner requirements but must
also obtain a permit to protest. While there are many places that one
may do any of a myriad of activities performed by the hearers the
limits on free speech are more severe. It is a far simpler matter for a
hearer to relocate himself than for the speaker to relocate herself if
they both want to resume their respective activities. This kind of an
expansion if pursued, could destroy the rights of others. While there
40

Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

41

Black’s Law Dictionary 224 (8th ed. 2007).

42

See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925) (discussing the creation
of the Incorporation Doctrine); Frisby v. Schultz 487 U.S. 474 (1988)
(discussing the Captive Audience Doctrine).

43

Dent, supra note 12, at 35.
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are certainly differences between a common political protest and
those performed by Westboro, the principles are unchanged. While it
is true that funeral-goers, unlike other hearers, cannot simply relocate
themselves to avoid unwanted speech, it is important to remember
that the distance at which the Matthew Snyder protest took place
the funeral-goers “‘could see no more than the tops of the picketers’
signs, and there is no indication that the picketing interfered with
the funeral service itself.”44 We must be careful lest in giving more
rights to one group we remove them from another.

IV. Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the picketing of military funerals by
Westboro creates a problem. Their actions are blatantly offensive to
public sentiment and to basic civil society, but the laws passed in
response to Westboro were reactionary and impulsive at best. It is
clear that the state and federal laws do not stand up to the gauntlet
that is strict scrutiny. A statutory remedy does not seem to give us
the solution to the Westboro Problem, namely one that will protect
the right to assembly and expression while also protecting the hearer.
The solution of an expanded definition or the creation of a right
by the judiciary also falls short of the ideal. To do so would be to take
the easy way out. It would be simple to create a new right each time
there is a serious discrepancy between protected rights and social
norms, but there can be little doubt that such a path would see the
devaluation of rights as its end. Soon we could see the right to health
care held in equal esteem with the right to property and the right to
Internet access coupled in everyday conversation with the right of
the pursuit of happiness.
This, to my mind, leaves two possible solutions to the Westboro
Problem. The first, and lesser of the two solutions, is that if it is so offensive to us that it must stop, we should pass an amendment. It is for
this very purpose that the amendment process was created and included in our Constitution. There was an understanding that society
would change and perhaps even improve over time and that if this
44

Snyder, 562 U.S. at 3.
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societal change warranted it then we should amend our constitution
to reflect that change.45 The common complaint about this type of a
solution is that it is difficult to accomplish. This was also a part of
the design of the Constitution; to create a system where change was
possible but where it would require a united effort. While this may
discourage some from adopting this solution, it seems that if society
is anxious enough to squelch speech that it finds disagreeable by
curtailing fundamental rights, then it should certainly be willing to
do it constitutionally through the amendment process.
The second solution, and the one that reflects a more refined society, is to do nothing. This may sound cowardly to some and just
plain unpatriotic to others but if society did nothing then so would
Westboro. It is the media frenzy that Westboro causes that keeps the
protests going. There are certain acts that laws cannot and should not
restrict because the same principle that would restrict their unsavory
action would restrict another’s good deeds.46 We cannot outlaw what
they are doing without trespassing against the Constitution, yet if
society would not endorse the actions of Westboro by lending them
their collective ear these protests would stop. We should not curtail
the liberties of the whole because of the actions of a few. Westboro
will not be here forever, but the rights that we have enjoyed and that
ought be enjoyed for generations to come can be.
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Drone Strikes and the War Powers Resolution
Brock Laney1

T

ariq Khan lived in North Waziristan, which, along with its
southern counterpart, suffers the majority of US drone strikes
in Pakistan.2 A British investigator asked Tariq if he had ever
seen a drone, expecting to hear a report of sighting one or two drones
per week.3 Instead, Tariq reported that he “saw 10 or 15 every day,”
with drones keeping him awake at night and causing him to worry
constantly about his family’s safety.4 Tariq died shortly after this interview alongside his 12-year-old cousin. Both were killed by a US
drone.5
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Proponents have called drones a last-resort weapon against
terrorists,6 while critics respond by pointing out a number of harmful
consequences that potentially outweigh the strikes’ benefits.7 Drones
undoubtedly have negative side effects on populations surrounding
their targets; civilian deaths, psychological trauma, economic disruption, social deterioration, and disrupted religious practices characterize regions with high concentrations of drone strikes.8 These
consequences do not necessarily mean that drones should no longer
have a place in the US arsenal. Instead, these consequences suggest
that careful, decentralized decision making should characterize discussions regarding their use.
Currently, decision making regarding the deployment of drones
is concentrated in the hands of an alarmingly small number of individuals9 and is thereby somewhat removed from democratic processes. The evolution of drones into unique and powerful instruments
of defense has occurred without the accompanying legislative in6
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frastructure to adequately regulate their usage. With minor modifications to existing legislation, Congress can create an environment
wherein drones receive scrutiny from a wider audience. Specifically,
the War Powers Resolution (WPR), which outlines congressional
and presidential war powers and responsibilities, can be amended to
provide an institutionalized check on the President’s power to deploy
drones.
My argument proceeds by (1) briefly addressing background information on drone strikes, (2) discussing the WPR in response to
critiques of its constitutionality, (3) defending the inclusion of drones
in the resolution by comparing drones with conventional weapons
and conflict law, and (4) outlining a specific plan for adjusting the
resolution to account for drone strikes which includes expanding
the definition therein to explicitly include drones. Despite criticisms
claiming the contrary, the WPR protects rights and rules outlined
by the Constitution. Additionally, presidential compliance with the
resolution since its enactment implies an inherent legitimacy. Congressional efforts to revise the WPR to account for drones will provide a valuable check on presidential power.

I. Background
Drones, unmanned aircraft often sent on pinpoint bombing
and reconnaissance missions, have been used with increasing frequency over the past few years.10 Drone strikes are especially used
in areas that are difficult to reach and where political restrictions
make conventional warfare unfeasible. On Pakistan’s side of the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, for example, terrorists and militants
have operated with relative ease from mountain caves and hideouts,

10
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eluding US forces stationed in Afghanistan.11 With drones, the US
can achieve the dual objective of reaching remote and difficult areas
while avoiding American casualties.
Defenders of drone strikes argue that drones number among the
United States’ last few viable options for combating terrorists and
militants.12 Even proponents of drone strikes, however, recognize the
array of flaws associated with their use.13 To begin, finding and monitoring suspected terrorists requires highly accurate intelligence14
and isolating potential targets to avoid civilian casualties has proven
nearly impossible.15 One scholar pointed out that “the Taliban don’t
go to a military base to build bombs or do training, [so] there are
families and neighbors around,”16 which results in inadvertent civilian deaths from drone strikes.17 Next, the strikes are “poor second[s]
to arrest”18 because US intelligence personnel cannot collect information from victims.19
Illustrating another drawback, drone strikes in Pakistan have
exacerbated already tense US-Pakistan relations. Although this has
not resulted in formal military repercussions, Pakistani officials
have condemned drone activity in Pakistan because it violates their
11
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sovereignty and harms their citizens.20 Similarly, the strikes can decrease US soft power abroad by disrupting diplomatic relations in
the Middle East and provoking victims to join terrorist groups in
the place of lost family members or friends.21 In response to a 2012
drone strike, for example, a member of the Yemeni Defense Ministry
said that he “would not be surprised if a hundred tribesmen joined
the lines of al-Qaeda as a result of the latest drone mistake.”22
These problems and the disputed efficacy of drone strikes23
make drones very costly and controversial weapons. The high costs
and dubious benefits create a set of decisions that democratic instincts suggest should not fall to only a few government officials. In
response to these concerns, some have called for a greater degree of
transparency along with the introduction of accountability to Congress for drone activity.24 This transparency and accountability acts
as an important step towards making the usage of drone strikes subject to public scrutiny.
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The growing frequency of US drone strikes and the high probability of drone usage proliferating25 to other countries indicate a
general movement towards unmanned military assets as war-making
tools. US legislators can anticipate future problems associated with
this shift by modifying existing legislation to account for drone
strikes now, thereby ensuring that future drone strikes occur under
transparent and democratic conditions. Through simple changes to
the WPR, Congress can take an important step towards controlling
the use of a complicated new resource.

II. The War Powers Resolution
Congress passed the WPR in an attempt to provide explicit legislative rules based on perceptions of the Framers’ intent when they
separated the powers to declare and direct war.26 The law was passed
after the Vietnam War to curtail the President’s somewhat unilateral war-making capabilities and make the executive branch more
accountable to Congress when unilateral action is necessary. The
resolution states that war can be initiated only if one of three conditions is fulfilled: “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”27
If the president deploys armed forces without a declaration of war,
the resolution requires the President to brief Congress on the conflict and justify the use of force within 48 hours.28 If Congress does
not ratify the war with an official declaration within 60 days, the
President then has 30 days to withdraw US armed forces from the
conflict.29 Although a straightforward law on its surface, critics have
taken issue with some of its details and implications.
25
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Critics, including many US Presidents,30 have questioned the
constitutionality of the WPR since it became law in 1973. Despite
this, all Presidents have either acted in accordance with the requirements of the WPR or have defended their lack of compliance by arguing that conflicts in which they have engaged do not apply to the
resolution’s requirements.31 To provide a recent example, President
Obama provided a report to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution”32 after sending troops to Uganda to fight the Lord’s
Resistance Army.33 When Mr. Obama did not send a report to Congress on US military activities in Libya, Harold Koh, the legal advisor to the State Department, justified this silence by asserting that
US operations in Libya did not constitute war.34 Further, Koh explicitly stated that the administration did not believe the resolution to be
unconstitutional.35 These facts notwithstanding, I address constitutional discrepancies for the sake of strengthening the argument in
favor of the WPR.
(i) The Precedent-Violation Argument
The first objection to the constitutionality of the resolution came
in the form of a veto from President Nixon, who stated that,
One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain
authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended
30
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them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force
of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in
approving legislation.36
No constitutional provision explicitly supports Nixon’s first objection. Rather, he relies on historical precedent, asserting that the
resolution would limit powers that the executive branch had been
exercising properly for years.37 In a vein similar to Nixon’s, some
have argued that the resolution tampers with an already effective
separation of powers, with one scholar arguing that neither branch
has the authority to define the limits of another’s power.38
Historical precedent notwithstanding, Congress justified the
resolution’s provisions by tying them to specific powers outlined in
the Constitution. The legislation cites the Constitution, which “specifically provide[s] that the Congress shall have the power to make
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only
its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”39 In the same section, Congress is given the power “to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces” as well as the responsibility to “provide for calling forth the
Militia.”40 The WPR violates neither constitutional statement, but is
instead supported by both. The resolution is an example of Congress
filling the legislative role outlined in the first statement and creates
rules that clearly fall under the category outlined in the second.
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The President may exercise the right to deploy troops when national emergencies require it.41 Without accountability to Congress,
however, the President could hypothetically wage war unilaterally
and indefinitely. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, the President engaging in a long-term armed conflict without congressional
approval, defending the conflict with an appeal to national defense.
As an example, Truman introduced American troops into the Korean War without congressional approval, relying instead on inferences drawn from a UN Security Council Resolution.42 Although
major fighting in Korea lasted only three years, American soldiers
remain in South Korea today in the unsteady aftermath of a war that
has not technically ended.43 Thus, a lack of carefully enforced institutionalized oversights can potentially lend itself to lengthy campaigns waged without congressional sanction.
Critics might contend that long, undeclared campaigns are necessary for national defense. While this is likely true in many cases,
the Constitution only allows for non-congressionally sanctioned military action when the US is “actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay.”44 Allowing Congress to check the
President’s long-term war powers protects the constitutional provision that the Legislature has the responsibility and right to declare
war and leaves the essential short-term war powers untouched.
(ii) The Legislative Veto
Nixon’s second constitutional objection concerns the presence in
the resolution of a legislative veto.45 The WPR contains a provision
41
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allowing Congress to require the President, by joint resolution, to
remove American forces from combat if the designated time limit
expires.46 According to Nixon, this provision constitutes a legislative
veto, which, because it circumvents presentment to the Executive,
acts as a de facto override of the President’s power to veto an act of
Congress.47 Questions concerning the legislative veto arose in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the results of which
have fueled criticisms of the WPR similar in nature to Nixon’s.
Jagdish Chadha, a Kenyan slated for deportation from the US,
submitted a deportation appeal to the Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) and an immigration judge found that Chadha qualified for a suspension of his deportation.48 Chadha’s request granted,
the INS submitted his name, along with 339 others, to Congress for
approval.49 The House of Representatives, exercising their perceived
legal right to apply a legislative veto, overruled the judge’s decision,
prompting an appeals process that escalated to the Supreme Court.50
The Court ultimately ruled against the House, finding the legislative veto unconstitutional,51 pointing out additionally that the House
violated the principle of bicameralism.52 This decision has provided
support for critics of the WPR who condemn the legislative veto
provision found therein.53
The Court’s ruling in Chadha does not, however, necessarily
outlaw legislative vetoes generally, nor does it guarantee the unconstitutionality of their usage under the WPR for two reasons. First,
dissenting opinions indicate the importance of the legislative veto
in preserving Congress’s constitutional powers. Supreme Court Jus46
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tice Powell, who agreed with the ruling “only in the judgment,”54
argued that “the breadth of this holding gives one pause. Congress
has included the veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back
to the 1930’s. Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to
controlling the delegation of power to administrative agencies.”55
Similarly, Justice White argued in a dissenting opinion that without the legislative veto, Congress would be forced to “refrain from
delegating necessary authority . . . or, in the alternative, to abdicate
its law-making function to the Executive Branch and independent
agencies.”56 These opinions indicate that including legislative vetoes
in some statutes and resolutions strengthens the system of checks
and balances instead of violating them.
Second, the legislative action condemned in Chadha is not perfectly comparable to the one in the WPR. The court found additional
fault with the House’s unilateral action because it violated the principle of bicameralism.57 The additional violation of bicameralism
makes the ruling in Chadha distinct from other forms of legislative
vetoes, thus potentially exempting the WPR from the implications of
this case. These distinctions have led some scholars to conclude that
Chadha does not condemn the WPR.58
Despite key differences between the legislative veto in Chadha
and the one in the WPR, some argue that Chadha does ultimately
confirm the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto in the resolution.59 Accepting this consensus, however, still does not destroy the
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validity of the WPR. The resolution’s Separability Clause60 indicates
that all other sections remain legally intact should any other section
fail to survive constitutional scrutiny.61 Although the removal of the
legislative veto capability would limit the ability of the legislature to
enforce the resolution, there are other tools Congress could implement to check presidential action.62
In conclusion, criticisms of the WPR ultimately fail because (1)
the resolution protects powers explicitly granted by the Constitution,63
(2) the legislative veto helps Congress protect constitutionally granted war powers,64 and (3) even given a conclusively unconstitutional
legislative veto, the Separability Clause protects all other clauses
in the resolution.65 Finally, regardless of criticisms of the WPR, US
Presidents have provided reports to Congress consistent with the requirements of the legislation since its enactment, providing evidence
of its legitimacy.66

III. Drone Strikes and the War Powers Resolution
Observed individually, single drone strikes might more closely
resemble assassinations than warfare. A more comprehensive view
of US drone operations in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, however,
reveals several characteristics that place drone strikes campaigns
more securely within the category of conventional warfare. Just as
Yorktown and Bunker Hill fall under the broader category of the
American Revolutionary War, individual drone strikes are often
constituent parts of larger campaigns with identifiable goals. Pro60
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longed drone strike campaigns resemble war in levels of casualties,
spillover effects into civilian populations, and consistency of attacks.
Additionally, the Obama administration has justified drone activity
by appealing to international conflict law, calling drone attacks part
of a war on a specific belligerent.67 Thus, in this section I discuss
similarities between drone strikes campaigns and war to justify the
inclusion of drones under the authority of Congress. After establishing this, I discuss specific changes to the WPR that can provide an
institutionalized accounting for drone activity.
(i) War-Like Characteristics of Drone Strikes Campaigns
First, drone strikes cause civilian and militant casualties in numbers that resemble trends typical of conventional warfare. Drone
strikes’ clandestine nature makes estimates of deaths from attacks
difficult to calculate, but careful studies of drone activity in Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia since 2002 estimate casualties between 3,90068
and 4,700.69 To provide a comparison, the US suffered roughly 4,485
casualties from 2003-2012 in Iraq.70Although US officials have
praised drones as capable of conducting surgical strikes with little
or no collateral damage,71 third parties estimate hundreds of civilian
67
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casualties.72 Drone strikes also cause significant injuries and property damage.73 Finally, the nearly constant presence of drones over
many villages in North and South Waziristan causes psychological
and stress-related health problems that affect large proportions of
civilian populations.74
Next, drone activity resembles war in its targeting of a specific
belligerent over an extended period of time. Drone strikes occur on
a monthly basis, with an average of roughly 32 deaths per month.75
Further, most drone strikes have targeted militants, the majority of
which were associated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.76 Attorney
General Holder argued that the US faces a “stateless enemy,”77 but it
is a specific enemy nonetheless. These facts, along with the regional
focus of anti-militant drone strikes, bear similarity to conventional
warfare wherein belligerents remain fixed and identifiable throughout the duration of a conflict.
Finally, the Obama administration consistently justifies drone
activity by citing international law as it relates to war, referring to
individual drone strikes as part of a war on al-Qaeda and the Taliban.78 Harold Koh, for example, defended drones by referencing the
72
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right of the US to self-defense, which is sanctioned by international
law.79 Koh stated that “the U.S. is in armed conflict with al-Qaeda as
well as the Taliban and associated forces in response to the horrific
acts of 9/11.”80 The administration’s explicit and repeated branding
of drone activity in the Middle East as war provides strong evidence
that drone campaigns deserve attention under the WPR alongside
conventional warfare.
Admittedly, drone campaigns are not identical to other forms of
war. Pakistan, for example, has not reacted to US military activity in
its country with physical retributive action. In drone warfare, however, countries are not the targets, which explains in great measure
Pakistan’s lack of military retaliation. Classifying drone campaigns
as war does not require complete uniformity of attributes with other
implements of traditional warfare because the nature of war is context dependent. Drones, deployed in the name of national defense,
should not be subject to a separate list of constraints than are other
instruments of war deployed for similar reasons.81
(ii) Accounting for Drones in the War Powers Resolution
The inclusion of drone strikes in the WPR would duly anticipate
an increasing trend towards fighting through unmanned vehicles.82
This global trend has indicated that “technologies that remove humans from the battlefield are becoming the new normal in war.”83
The costs to the US in terms of personnel casualties and political
79
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capital remain so low relative to other types of conflict that drone
usage will likely persist or increase in frequency. The changing
nature of international conflict suggests that drones and other unmanned military assets will probably become important aspects of
war. Properly classifying drones and implementing a congressional
check on their usage at a time when they are emerging as conventional weapons is therefore very important.
Accounting for drones through the WPR would require only
small modifications to the legislation. The resolution refers to “armed
forces” as the asset of interest that Congress seeks to regulate.84 To
induct drones into the WPR, legislators can expand the definition
of armed forces therein to explicitly include drones and other unmanned military assets. Specifically, the resolution should define
“armed forces” as any US military asset, manned or unmanned,
deployed in the interest of national security with specific military
target(s). Similar to the current version of the resolution, the updated
law should require any President that deploys these military assets to
abide by the restrictions and protocols outlined therein.
An effective definition of drone strikes as part of the armed
forces must necessarily address conditional factors since drones are
not used exclusively for long-term campaigns. Drones are sometimes
used for assassinations and other objectives, and although guidelines
for controlling their use in these other areas are too broad to be discussed here, modifications to the resolution should account for those
distinct circumstances. To avoid unnecessary and possibly detrimental consequences of reporting covert operations to Congress, the
updated resolution should include a clause that limits the type of
drone activity the President must report to Congress. To distinguish
between long-term campaigns and single attacks, the law should
specify that two attacks targeting the same group or occurring in the
same country within one month of each other constitute the beginning of a campaign. Once this condition is met, proceeding with the
campaign would require presidential action as outlined in the WPR.
Although seemingly arbitrary, two drone strikes in one month
is likely an effective indicator that a series of attacks is becoming a
84
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campaign, and Congress should have the power to exert its constitutional authority when such a benchmark is reached. Reports indicate
that there have been, on average, 2.84 drone attacks per month in
Pakistan since 2004.85 Attacks in Yemen exhibit similar patterns,
although the consistency of those attacks has not risen to Pakistan’s
levels until recently.86 Using these current trends as a baseline helps
determine the appropriate attack frequency for determining the
starting point of a campaign. Because unsuccessful assassination attempts may necessitate a second attack in a relatively short period of
time, the success of an attack should be considered in the definition
of which attacks count towards defining a series of attacks as a campaign. Only attacks that successfully eliminate the intended target
should be counted towards the limit. This will allow for repeated
attempts if an assassination or other single operation endeavor fails
after an initial attempt.
Some might argue that including drone strikes in the WPR
raises the cost of using drones to an unacceptably high level because
their use would require formal sanction. Congressional approval,
however, does not necessarily constitute an official declaration of
war. Presidents have reported a number of conflicts to Congress
consistent with the WPR that have proceeded without an official
declaration from Congress.87 Additionally, the Obama administration explicitly classifies the conflict with al-Qaeda and the Taliban
as “armed conflict”88 and gaining explicit approval from Congress
would not change the costs of moving forward with the conflict.
Finally, obtaining congressional approval would potentially create
85
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greater domestic legitimacy for a campaign, thereby strengthening
the President’s political position instead of weakening it. These considerations indicate that Congress can justifiably and easily address
the lack of institutional oversight for drone warfare through modifying the WPR.

IV. Conclusion
Although critics have disputed the constitutionality of the WPR,
the major functional pieces of the law are specifically backed by the
Constitution. Further, US Presidents have provided reports to Congress in compliance with the legislation, suggesting some level of
implied legitimacy for the resolution. Revising the WPR to include
drones and other non-conventional weapons will provide an essential check on presidential power as these forms of conflict become
more common in the future.
The current drone strikes campaign has proven very costly
and the cost-benefit analysis should not be limited to the President,
White House aides, and a handful of correspondents at the CIA. The
negative consequences of drone strikes suggest that a greater number of decision makers should become involved in the discussion
of whether or not to move forward with these costly campaigns of
dubious merit.
The nature of conflict is constantly evolving. Legislation must
also evolve through a combination of pragmatism and foresight in
the interest of protecting democratic processes and human rights.

Strengthening Rule of Law in China: The Need
for Increased Adherence to the Constitution
and Precedent in the Supreme People’s Court
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M

a Wenlin was a lawyer who in 1997 sought to relieve many
farmers in Shaanxi, China of illegal and exorbitant taxes imposed by local government officials. Believing that
the higher courts would be sympathetic to the peasants’ plight and
oppose local corruption, he filed a lawsuit on behalf of the farmers. However, it was not until Mr. Ma first appealed to the county
government that he began to understand the full extent and breadth
of Chinese government corruption. When the county refused to
acknowledge his petition, he subsequently appealed to the district
court and finally the State Council’s Petitions and Appeals Office, all
without redress. The depth of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials’ corruption made Ma’s defense of the peasants’ constitutional
rights close to impossible. Ma quickly comprehended that it was “not
just lower-level officials in the village and township,” but also the
government structure at higher levels that “were corrupt and working hand in hand.”2
Upon announcing economic “Reform and Opening” for the
People’s Republic of China in 1978, China’s paramount leader Deng
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Xiaoping emphasized, “We must strengthen our legal system . . .
to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the
leadership changes, or whenever the leadership changes their views
or shifts the focus of their attention. The trouble now is that our legal
system is incomplete, with many laws yet to be enacted.”3 Since Reform and Opening, China has made significant legal improvements,
paving the way for what one scholar has called a rising Chinese “legal consciousness.”4 However, criticism has also accompanied this
legal attention as the immaturity and injustices of China’s legal system have been increasingly manifested. At the root of China’s legal
struggles is not only the Communist-controlled Supreme People’s
Court’s lack of true autonomy, but also repeated failures to uphold
China’s Constitution and legal precedent. These failures are leading many Chinese citizens and activists to criticize the CCP for inconsistently administrating the law and to demand more consistent
protection of their constitutionally enumerated rights. Ultimately,
if China is to keep pace with current economic development and
prevent escalating social unrest, its Supreme People’s Court must
develop better methods of implementing and ensuring more just and
consistent rule of law. Promoting the supremacy of China’s Constitution through adherence to principles of legal precedent and appeals
will reduce both manipulation of the law and government corruption.
In the first sections of this paper, I will highlight the historical development of law in China, as well as some key provisions
and rights enumerated in China’s Constitution. Then, I will examine specific challenges China faces in terms of securing legitimate
rule of law, in contrast with rule by man, as well as the negative
consequences China will likely face should it fail to reform its legal
system. Finally, I will recommend how China can more effectively
promote constitutional rule of law and lessen CCP corruption by
selecting judges with greater legal aptitude and proficiency (as op3
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posed to the current system where priority is given to party loyalty).
These reforms will facilitate a more mature, precedential, and appellate legal system, effectively increasing the future economic security
and societal stability in China. These changes will also improve Chinese public perception of the government.

I. Recent Historical Development of Law in China
The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of the People’s Republic of
China experienced inconsistencies from its establishment in November 1950, which hindered Chinese legal development for decades.
From the CCP’s inception, China’s justice system had little autonomy from party decrees,5 and thus the instability of CCP policies
directly contributed to chaos in the courts. Consequently, the Party
undermined rule of law from the 1950s through the mid 1970s by
restricting the SPC’s power.
Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening,” however, profoundly
changed Chinese law. Because he experienced a system under Mao
Zedong where lawlessness was rampant and the rule of law was unpredictable, Deng committed to establishing “a socialist legal system,” which paved the way for 1982’s adoption of China’s current
Constitution. China’s new Constitution included a provision that
“gave the court greater status than it had enjoyed under either the
1975 or 1978 constitutions.”6 This was motivated primarily by China’s need to address the increasing civil and commercial demands
that would inevitably accompany an expanding market economy.
Deng knew that a stronger and more reliable judiciary would be fundamental to China’s successful establishment of what he termed economic “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”
Deng also emphasized increased education of future legal cadres
to strengthen China’s legal system. In Mao’s terms, that cadre would
have to be both “red” and “expert.”7 To this end, Deng actively sup5
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ported the establishment of Chinese institutions for more advanced
legal training which would emphasize “proficiency in legal knowledge [and] a high degree of political integrity.” 5 Though there were
less than 2,000 lawyers at the beginning of Reform and Opening
in 1978, by 2008 there were 157,000 licensed lawyers, 14,000 law
firms, and more than 600 universities that offered bachelor’s degrees
in law.8 Pitman B. Potter notes, “Law faculties are filled to capacity
with many of China’s best students, driven by the prospect of lucrative employment to study a field that . . . did not exist 25 years ago.
Law firms have multiplied—more than 5,000 have been established
since 1990, bringing the total to more than 9,000. And through it
all, the government delivers a steady litany of . . . policy pronouncements extolling the importance of the rule of socialist law.”9 These
trends and statistics demonstrate China’s objective to create a stronger, more mature legal system with more capable lawyers and judges
to ensure the successful implementation of economic reform.10
In examining China’s current path toward securing legal reform,
however, it is necessary to examine China’s constitutional guarantees to its people. A better understanding of these rights will facilitate further examination of legal challenges that have since arisen
in applying the Constitution and laws to individual circumstances.
Rule of law principles and citizens’ rights are clearly outlined in
the 1982 Constitution, its fourth since the first 1955 draft. The beginning Articles assert the supremacy of the Constitution in Chinese
law by stating that “all state organs, the armed forces, all political
parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings
must abide by the Constitution and the law.”11 Other Articles guarantee specific rights such as the right to own earned income and prop8
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erty, freedom of speech and the press, and the freedom of assembly.12
Perhaps the most liberally bold (and therefore controversial) right
granted in China’s Constitution is found in Article 41, which states,
“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to criticize
and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary . . . [and]
make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state
organ or functionary. . . . Citizens who have suffered losses through
infringement of their civil rights by any state organ or functionary
have the right to compensation in accordance with the law” (emphasis added).13
Many recent Chinese activists’ petitions and lawsuits are demanding their constitutionally sanctioned right to seek redress for
government violations of and failures to protect the people’s rights.
As some citizens begin to understand their rights and use the courts
to protect those rights, more Chinese are following suit and turning
to the courts for redress.14 These citizens’ ultimate hope is for constitutional rule of law to supersede government leaders’ impulsive
decisions and corruption, thus accomplishing justice.

II. China’s Legal Challenges
Although Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms put China on the path
toward rule of law, they failed to establish legitimate judge-selection
criteria. Accordingly, the courts remained biased and continued operating primarily under rule by man. Lo defines rule of law as a legal
system that protects individuals from arbitrary power, ensures that
no one is punished except for “a distinct breach of the law,” prohibits anyone from being above the law, and provides “procedural and
institutional guarantees . . . for the rights of the individual.”15 While
Deng intended for his reforms to make law “the highest authority” in
12

See for example articles 13 and 35.

13

Supra note 11.

14

Gallagher, supra note 4, at 791.

15

Lo, supra note 3, at 660.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 27, 2013

38

China to protect society from political whims, his cardinal principle
was still “leadership by the Party.” 16 Deng had thus paved the way
for “socialist rule of law,” or in other words, rule of law with Chinese
characteristics.17 Party leaders like Peng Zhen attempted to reconcile
the contradiction between rule of law and rule of the CCP by asserting that “law and party policy . . . are not interchangeable since
they perform different roles in achieving party objectives.”18 Despite
China’s increased legal awareness facilitated by Deng’s reforms, this
contradictory legal paradigm still places the CCP above the law in
power and influence. Accordingly, China’s legal system defies Lo’s
basic definition of rule of law.
Despite party attempts to resolve the contradiction, an apparent
power struggle between CCP authority and authority of the law itself
is contained in China’s Constitution. The paradox is that while the
CCP declares the function of law to be to “constrain state power,”
they also “insist on the primacy of the party.”19 Stanley Lubman illustrates this legal tension between past legislation and current CCP
policies, noting that China’s 1982 Constitution requires both obedience to the law and supremacy of the CCP in legal authority. Accordingly, legislation is viewed primarily as an instrument to implement
future CCP policies rather than an established regulation that limits
the CCP’s actions.20 Essentially, the challenge facing China is in determining how much current party policy needs to reflect past legislation, especially China’s constitutionally enumerated rights. Does
the written law of the land have the final word in determining legality, or is the law to serve more as a guideline to be interpreted freely
by the Standing Committee or the lower party leadership? This question continues to be central to legal challenges that have been leveled
against CCP officials’ corruption and injustice. In current practice,
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however, “legislation is . . . dependent on and potentially secondary
to CCP formulation of specific policies.”21
The general lack of both transparency and acknowledgment of
precedent further complicate China’s judicial system. Despite the
2009 reforms to improve legal transparency, legal opinions are rarely made public, and trials are usually closed to the media in spite of
government assertions that the rulings in Chinese trials are transparent.22 This failure to publicize judicial rulings has facilitated legal corruption because judges are not publically scrutinized and are
therefore subject to the will and pressure of CCP leaders. Transparency problems have also contributed to a judicial system with little
regard for legal precedent. Because previous decisions are not widely
published, there is little pressure on judges to uphold prior rulings in
court. Consequently, “court decisions do not have binding precedential value as in a common law system like the United States.”23 Such
transparency, corruption, and precedential difficulties all serve as
major hindrances to China’s effective establishment of resilient and
reliable rule of law.
Recent developments, however, illustrate a growing legal consciousness in China as well as an increasingly responsive government to public demands. For instance, in 2010 the SPC partnered
with Stanford Law School to establish the Guiding Cases Project,
with the goal of promoting a more effective Chinese legal precedential system. Although this reform does not parallel current Western
norms of legal precedent through landmark cases, this is a progressive turn in the direction of legal precedent. Article 7 of the 2010
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on the
Guiding Cases states that “People’s courts at all levels should refer
to the Guiding Cases released by the SPC when adjudicating simi-
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lar cases.”24 If these guiding cases are utilized to the extent that the
SPC has asserted, they will serve as a foundation of legal precedent
and appeals in China. Civil rights attorneys will be able to reference these cases in defending Chinese citizens’ legal rights. Before
discussing how China should select better-educated judges to carry
out such reform, I will explore cases that demonstrate China’s lack
of an effective precedential system, as well as the Chinese people’s
recently increasing level of legal consciousness.

III. Need for Greater Precedent in Appeals
The aforementioned case of Mr. Ma and the Shaanxi peasants
effectively demonstrates the need for greater precedent and justice
in China’s legal system and also demonstrates judicial instability
and uncertainty’s negative effect on Chinese society. Mr. Ma’s story
highlights not only China’s growing legal consciousness, but also the
challenges Chinese reformers face in attempting to secure individual
rights and uphold the constitutional rule of law on the principle of
precedent. Although court decisions are not directly administered
by the CCP as they were historically, Ma’s case reveals that Chinese
law’s primary function is to enforce and uphold current CCP policies, even at the expense of constitutionally prescribed individual
rights and decisions that previous courts have made.25
Party leaders’ failure to effectively adhere to the rule of law is
directly related to government corruption. While selecting bettereducated judges will not solve the lack-of-autonomy problem, it will
improve the consistency and fairness of judges’ decisions because
they will be informed of standard legal procedures, the content and
proper application of the constitution, as well as the value of adhering to previous precedent. According to Ian Johnson, “Law in
China is not neutral. Courts and judges are part of the government,
24
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not independent of it. . . . Even the Constitution gives a nod to the
party’s supremacy. . . . Instead of allowing laws to rule the land, the
government uses laws to rule.”26 The Communist Party’s superiority over the law is seen plainly in Mr. Ma’s lawsuit. From a legal
standpoint, his case should have been upheld in court; by law, “local
authorities could only tax farmers five percent of their income. But
[Ma] could produce hundreds of witnesses with hard proof showing
that they’d been taxed many times this amount.”27 Ma’s purpose was
not to challenge political authority but rather to demand adherence
to the rule of law.
Ma’s case also illustrates the need for precedential adherence
in China’s courts. Since a nearly identical and recent case in Peijiawan had successfully ended exorbitant taxes on their peasants, Ma’s
appeal was not unusual or without precedent. Logically, his appeal
for the peasants should have been granted, or at least given serious
consideration. However, as Johnson observes, “China’s legal system
doesn’t have the concept of precedents—courts often make rulings
that completely ignore the fact that other courts have ruled differently in similar cases.”28 Because party officials felt threatened by
Ma’s challenge to their authority, they decided in this particular case
to not enforce the law they had previously written, thereby ignoring
their own legal precedent. The fact that they would ignore precedent
in such a clearly parallel case illustrates not only poor judgment, but
also lack of basic understanding of the value of precedent in establishing a strong rule of law society. The best way to address such
ignorance is to ensure that China’s judges are better educated, beginning with the SPC.
Mr. Ma’s associate later explained the local party officials’ reasoning in Mr. Ma’s case when he said, “If all the peasants in China
file class-action lawsuits, then the Communist Party is finished. So
Ma Wenlin’s case couldn’t be allowed to succeed.”29 Because of his
26
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audacious challenge of the status quo, Ma was an unfortunate recipient of cruelty; when he appealed his case to the Beijing Public Security Bureau in 1998, he was brought into the office and beaten by two
men, losing thirteen teeth. He was then sentenced to five years in a
labor camp.30 The failure of equal protection under the law for those
peasants (as guaranteed in China’s Constitution) stands as a glaring
reminder of the immaturity of China’s legal system and the daunting
obstacles to establishing a more refined reliable and reformed legal
system in China.

IV. Citizens Appealing for their Constitutional Rights
In order to establish a stable legal system, China must abide by
the Constitution and precedent; however, ignorant judges currently
allow the CCP’s concerns to override the Constitution as the supreme
authority in China. The power of party over legal justice is illustrated in several groundbreaking cases such as the Qi Yuling case of
1990. Because an appeal was successfully made to the China’s SPC
defending an individual’s right to receive an education, this case is
now regarded as “the first judicial application of the Constitution”
in China.31 Though not directly challenging government officials,
it was a bold appeal of lower level rulings, as well as an assertion
of an individual’s legal rights. Qi Yuling’s case offers evidence of a
slowly reforming judiciary in China; however, the ruling was eventually overturned because the CCP feared empowering the public to
challenge decisions in court. Unfortunately, the CCP’s concerns for
maintaining power overshadowed Qi Yuling’s constitutional rights,
and this previously important legal precedent was undermined.
Qi Yuling’s attempt exemplifies how China’s Constitution is becoming more relevant to the Chinese people despite the CCP’s regular disregard for constitutional rights. Chen Jianfu asserts that “One
must not dismiss the Chinese Constitution out of hand. . . . [A]fter a
30
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decade or so of legal reforms, a number of administrative laws and
regulations have been issued implementing various aspects of the
Constitution and, thus making the Constitution much more relevant”
to ordinary Chinese people.32 Qi’s successful appeal illustrates the
impact a citizen’s legal action can have; Zaozhuang Municipality
Intermediate People’s Court’s ruling on Qi’s case was successfully
(though only partly) reversed, an unprecedented event in Chinese
legal history.33 Qi’s appeal was groundbreaking because Chinese
judges had long held that the Constitution should not be referenced
in court or used to justify judges’ decisions.34 One critic of the Qi
decision noted that the “direct application of constitutional provisions in that particular case” was challenged by numerous Chinese
legal academics.35 Despite opposition, Qi’s constitutionally appealed
right to receive an education provides a glimpse of the potential for
China’s constitutional supremacy in administering consistent and
just rule of law.
Unfortunately, even in a case as significant as Qi’s, the CCP
eventually calculated that its own interests would come before adhering to the Constitution and precedent. In December 2008, the
SPC surprisingly revoked the decision because “it [was] no longer
applicable.”36 Despite the tremendous attention the Qi Yuling decision initially received, it soon “disappeared from judicial discourse
and was never heard from again.”37 CCP officials were clearly troubled by the SPC’s granting a constitutional appeal for individual
rights protection when those rights were, in their judgment, “not
32
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found in any statute.”38 In an evident tension between the Court’s
constitutional interpretation and the CCP leadership’s worries, party
leaders prevailed and the Court importantly decided to comply, successfully ensuring that the case would be regarded as an “outlier, not
a trendsetter.”39
Evidence suggests that the CCP continues to exercise greater
influence than the Constitution, especially when it senses that its
power could be threatened, thus deterring the establishment of rule
of law. In 2009, civil rights lawyers Liu Wei and Tang Jitian defended Falun Gong practitioner Yang Ming in an appeals case. Yang
was convicted of “using superstitious sects [cults] to undermine the
implementations of the law.”40 Liu and Tang argued insufficient evidence on grounds that the State never declared Falun Gong a cult.
The presiding judge decided to prevent them from fully presenting
their argument. Liu and Tang then protested that the court had violated their rights as enumerated in Articles 36 and 37 of the 2007
Lawyers Law (which protect lawyers’ rights to present their cases
before a court). However, Article 49 declares that lawyers may not
“disrupt the order of a court . . . or interfere with normal conduct of
litigation or arbitration.”41 Almost a year later, the Beijing Bureau of
Justice ordered a hearing that considered disbarring the two attorneys for their actions.42 Though they sought to defend their case with
Articles 36 and 37, they were both disbanded for violating Article
49. Additionally, in 2005 and 2006, before Liu and Tang’s case, lawyers who defended Falun Gong practitioners had their law licenses
suspended for a period. And in another instance, lawyers Zhang
Xingshui and Zhou Min defended another civil rights case, but lost.
They were unable to renew their law licenses before they could ap38
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peal the decision because of their perceived attempt to disrupt court
order.43
These cases collectively demonstrate that although the Chinese
Constitution has enumerated citizens’ rights, the protection of both
the CCP’s image and its authority is ultimately more important than
legal guarantees to China’s citizens. According to Attorney Elizabeth M. Lynch, “[C]hinese lawyers should take warning—courts
consider zealous advocacy on behalf of a client a challenge to their
authority, and the rights supposedly guaranteed in Articles 36 and 37
of the 2007 Lawyers Law will be quickly subverted by Article 49’s
vaguely-worded prohibition against ‘disrupting the courtroom.’”44
This provision of the Lawyers Law provides a significant stumbling
block to the development of a stable and predictable appellate legal
system.
In the face of these controversial decisions, Qi Yuling’s decision (prior to its reversal) offers hope for China’s future with judges
who effectively apply the Constitution to uphold individual rights.
Though the overturn of the Qi decision left it “effectively defunct,”
the case still serves as “something of a minor talisman for those who
are pushing, both in the academy and the courtroom, for a greater
judicial role in constitutional rights protection.”45 Despite the decision’s reversal, Woo and Gallagher still emphasize the significance
of this pivotal case by saying, “Qi Yuling played a role in the evolution of public rights consciousness in China and may yet play a
renewed role in the reform of the system of constitutional litigation
in China.”46 Furthermore, despite the government’s discouragement
and punishment of civil rights attorneys like Liu Wei and Zhang
Xingshui, their cases do suggest a legal awareness that is rapidly
developing in China. Civil rights attorneys are increasingly seeking
opportunities to defend Chinese citizens’ rights, thereby attempting
to build a rule of law society.
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V. Consequences of Inaction
Unfortunately, examples of rule of law violations like these are
commonplace in China. Peerenboom notes that these problems are
not anomalies, and that “foreign investors complain bitterly about
the lack of rule of law [in China]; human rights activists denounce
the repeated persecution of political dissidents; citizens continue
to complain about judges on the take, notwithstanding the ongoing campaign to root out judicial corruption”.47 Although China has
made rapid progress recently, “indigent defendants [still] often cannot secure the service of a lawyer.”48 While these legal challenges
certainly will not be resolved in a short time frame, they will likely
prove disastrous to China both economically and politically if not
addressed seriously.
Evidence shows that China’s potential for continued economic
growth and development increases significantly if it pursues a path
of securing rule of law through better educating its judges. In terms
of economic growth measures like property rights and transaction
costs, predictable and stable laws clearly promote economic growth
and business investment in a society.49 The reverse is also true; a
lack of stable laws is closely correlated with economic and political
instability.
In Amsden’s book Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, South Korea is shown to be an example of a recently
industrialized nation that is now thriving in the world economy.
They have adopted and implemented effective rule of law measures,
with a system of highly qualified judges who implement the law according to the South Korean Constitution and precedent from previous court decisions. South Korea additionally has a remarkable
degree of social stability, particularly considering the adverse and
tense conditions that accompany the North Korean threat to their
existence. In contrast, Thomas Carothers observes, “Promoting the
47
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rule of law advances both principles and profits. What will it take
for Russia to move beyond Wild West capitalism to more orderly
market economies? Developing rule of law . . . is the key. How can
Mexico negotiate its treacherous economic, political and social transitions? . . . Establish once and for all the rule of law.”50 Thus in each
instance, weak rule of law leads to both societal and economic instability; China’s successful preemption of such adverse conditions
must center on more effectively strengthening the rule of law.

VI. Recommendations and Conclusion
As Deng Xiaoping believed, “leadership by the party” and “rule
of law” need not be mutually exclusive in China. In fact, to effectively maintain either in the long term, China’s legislators must establish
a system that honors precedent to secure all Chinese citizens’ constitutionally prescribed guarantees. Currently, three primary obstacles
prevent stable precedential rule of law in China: (1) CCP supremacy
over the law; (2) lack of trained judges; and (3) corruption.51 Because
CCP supremacy is unlikely to change in the near future, precedent
will only be realized when China undertakes more serious reform
of its judge-selection process for the SPC. Judges who are better
educated in Chinese laws, the Constitution, and the Guiding Cases
reforms will be critical to preserving societal order, preventing corruption, and fostering economic growth in China. It is apparent that
for China’s courts, as with all other CCP-dominated institutions,
change will most effectively be implemented from the top down.
The CCP must secure rule of law in China through reforming the
SPC.
Recent CCP attempts to reform legal aptitude and limit corruption have mostly proven to be unsuccessful; they do, however,
suggest China’s desire for improvement. Under President Jiang Zemin, the CCP attempted to address rule of law concerns through the
50
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Third Amendment in 1999 as well as through the 2007 amendment
of the Law on Lawyers designed to strengthen the legal profession.52
However, these reforms have not adequately come to fruition, as
evidenced by a host of “recent cases [which] show that the CCP is
still disregarding the rule of law and allows political will to dominate their decisions”53 and corruption cases that are increasing in
quantity and intensity.54 These failures are largely due to the SPC’s
primary loyalty to CCP dictates and blatant disregard for written
laws, constitutional provisions, and even previous court decisions.
Despite the CCP’s persisting “rule by man” tendencies and corruption, the recently announced Guiding Cases Project offers a promising glimpse of future Chinese rule of law through precedent. Should
China choose to pursue the path of promoting adherence to the guiding cases they have designated, they will have arguably taken the
most important step since Reform and Opening toward establishing
binding precedential rule of law. In order for this reform to have
full effect, however, it will be essential for China to employ bettertrained judges who will ensure that newly presented cases will be
addressed in accordance with the guiding cases released by the SPC.
If they fail to demonstrate such competence, the guiding cases will
be remembered as another empty promise, and the Chinese people’s
status will remain stagnant or even degenerate.
Placing “expert” judges on the SPC, and eventually on lower
courts, will be absolutely critical to establishing a system where
precedent and appeals operate properly. Though a judge’s lack of
legal expertise does not necessarily lead to corruption, demanding
judges’ legal proficiency increases the likelihood that legal rulings
and decisions will prove consistent with China’s established laws.55
China has taken important steps in the right direction toward selecting better trained judges, placing recent emphasis on selecting for
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“professionalism and procedural justice.” However, Chinese judges
on average are still “not very competent: the majority of the judges
have received no formal education in the law.”56 Not surprisingly,
China’s current judge-selection system “favors personal and political loyalty over integrity and competence” as evidenced by Article
6 of the Party Directive for the Selection and Appointment of Party
Cadres. The Directive gives six points of selective criteria, with the
first four points all focused on loyalty to the CCP. The fifth point is
the only given criterion that mentions “law-abiding and honest public service.” Thus, it is apparent in the current selection process that
priority is given to “political quality” over “professional quality.”57
To counter this emphasis on loyalty over aptitude, the CCP
clearly must change the laws to promote better-educated SPC nominations. In addition to the Guiding Cases Project, the CCP should
draft a new law demanding SPC judges with higher judicial aptitude.
A legal cadre capable of interpreting the guiding cases in harmony
with the 1982 Constitution will likely follow. Together, education
and the guiding case reforms will likely establish a stable precedent
in China. To meld the two reforms, after passing the law demanding better-educated judges, the CCP should design a more comprehensive Confucian-style legal aptitude examination that prospective
judges must pass before being sworn in. This exam should require
knowledge of 1) The 1982 Constitution, 2) Chinese laws and past
court rulings, and 3) application of the guiding cases. If a nominee
fails to score 90% or higher on each of the three sections, they will
fail to qualify for judicial appointment. The mere presence of an
exam that tests knowledge of principles like precedential application
will ensure that CCP officials nominate legally adept candidates for
judgeship and limit corruption or political favors that often characterizes China’s current judge-selection process. The exam itself will
ensure that judges without knowledge of the laws, Constitution, and
guiding cases are not allowed to make decisions contrary to precedent and China’s constitutionally sanctioned rights.
56
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China’s legislators should recognize that requiring greater adherence to legal precedent would not necessarily be a step towards
democracy. The CCP has long been reluctant to allow institutional
or legal reforms, even if gradual, for fear of eliciting the allusion
of Western democratic transition, and therefore weakening its tight
control of the Chinese government. This hesitancy makes it difficult for the CCP to accept the need to prioritize legal aptitude over
political loyalty.58 Precedential and constitutional adherence would
simply ensure that the courts observe the laws that the CCP itself
has written and that the court’s decision-making is consistent. Such
consistency will not only boost the image of the government’s commitment to root out internal corruption, but will also improve Chinese citizens’ perception of the government as their constitutionally
enumerated rights are recognized and protected in the courts. This
would likely mitigate the high levels of unrest and dissatisfaction
(particularly in the countryside) in China, and thereby decrease the
likelihood of protests or revolution that Chinese leaders dread. It
would be a policy of strength, not of weakness, demonstrating to the
Chinese people that the CCP is confident in its leadership and committed to adhere to the Constitution.
An important concession that has to be observed in order for
precedential rule of law to function in a Chinese context will be that,
for the present time, members of the SPC continue to be appointed
by CCP leaders. If the CCP does not have the final say in which
judges are confirmed, these reforms are highly unlikely to be considered by Party leaders. Chinese courts still enjoy a notable degree of
autonomy because “the courts still decide most of the criminal, civil,
and economic cases on their own,” with the general overarching rule
being to “follow instructions from the CCP.”59 The CCP will continue to “direct the verdicts in cases of national or local importance,”60
and this pattern should be expected to continue without disruption.
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It remains to be seen what the CCP’s role in relation to the judiciary will likely be moving forward, and whether the Constitution
will ever truly be the supreme law of the land. Regarding the SPC,
Article 126 of China’s Constitution states, “The people’s courts shall,
in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently
and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, public
organizations or individuals.”61 Currently, this explicitly prescribed
court autonomy is not being observed in the SPC or lower courts
today. Like other constitutionally sanctioned rights and powers not
currently enforced, the courts’ eventual autonomy should serve as a
guiding post for the CCP’s path to judicial reform. Though cases like
Mr. Ma’s and Qi Yuling’s cast considerable doubt on the permanency
and veracity of China’s constitutionally enumerated rights, they also
offer hope. They both illustrate China’s growing legal awareness and
reveal Chinese citizens’ desires to establish effective, predictable,
and constitutional rule of law.
Selecting better qualified judges in the Supreme People’s Court
will certainly not solve all of China’s legal problems, nor will it singlehandedly secure a fixed system of effective constitutional rule
of law. Reforming the judicial selection procedure will, however,
strengthen the legal system and be a major step towards establishing
reliable rule of law. Recognizing many remaining barriers such as
routine party corruption, lack of transparency, and lack of judicial
autonomy, China has a long march toward lasting reform. Ultimately, the CCP must change along with the judiciary in positive ways
to create a culture of stable precedent. Further, even with better-educated judges, their decision-making will ultimately depend on the
judges’ individual wisdom and morals. While increased education
generally leads to better decisions, it is by no means a guarantee that
they will make constitutionally sound legal decisions. Nevertheless,
educating judges regarding rule of law principles is pragmatically
one of the best steps the CCP can take to secure a better future for
China.
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Today, China’s underdeveloped and inconsistent legal system
threatens to disrupt economic growth, government legitimacy, and
societal stability in the People’s Republic of China. This unreliability is largely due to the CCP’s failure to follow the basic principles of
legal precedent and constitutional supremacy. Though these shortcomings are prominent, China’s positive developments do indicate
that “an increasingly transparent, participatory, and accountable
China [will] continue to progress further . . . toward rule of law.” 62
Despite these improvements, China must more emphatically pursue
the path of legal reform through demanding better trained judges
who adhere to legal precedent; only then can China’s constitutional rights and protections afforded to each citizen be fully secured,
thereby establishing greater legitimacy and longevity through rule
of law.

62

Horsley, supra note 8, at 67.

Religious Condom-Nation
Andrew Moore1

R

eligious freedom is one of the most important and basic
human rights. The specific nuances of that right, however,
are difficult to define. Even the seemingly simple concept
of “religious freedom” can be broken down into two quite different categories of rights. First, there is freedom from religion, which
serves to prevent religious oppression. This right is embodied in the
concept that the state may not endorse any religion in word or deed,
nor expect any form of religiosity from its citizens. The Establishment Clause in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees this aspect of religious freedom.2 Second, there is freedom
of religious expression. Americans have come to expect that their
respective methods of worship and/or moral expression will not be
hindered by the state, but this paper will discuss some of the exceptional circumstances in which religious expression should be limited
by state action.
According to the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” The extent to
which this right is applicable, however, becomes a controversial issue because actions by one party, even if religiously motivated, can
have a negative effect on other parties. The Supreme Court recognized the potential of such negative effects in Reynolds v. United
1
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States,3 in which Chief Justice Waite justified Congressional laws
limiting religious action in the specific case of religions that teach
their adherents to practice polygamy. He reasoned that laws restricting such practices should be upheld in order to prevent inadvertently
establishing precedent for constitutional protection of religious action such as human sacrifice. In the case of conflict between multiple
parties’ Free Exercise rights, the courts must determine which parties’ rights to favor. The difficulty of determining whether various
religious expressions tread on the rights of others is further complicated by the requirement that the state not endorse any religion(s)
over another, since limiting one sect’s expression is essentially the
same as giving preference to all religious groups except the limited
religion.4
Many of the conflicts between religious and secular interests in
the United States center on social and moral issues. Currently, one
heavily contested conflict between the rights of religion and government is that of healthcare rules and regulations. On January 20, 2012,
Health and Human Services (HHS) announced that all insurance
plans, including those provided by employers, would be required to
cover contraceptives at no cost to the patient, or pay a fine. This requirement comes as a provision under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,5 and, since the announcement of the requirement,
more than fifty suits have been brought to U.S. courts challenging
what has now become commonly known as the “HHS mandate.”6
The majority of these lawsuits against Health and Human Services have been filed by churches, religious-affiliated universities
3
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and hospitals, and businesses owned or operated by religious persons. These plaintiffs claim that the contraceptives mandate violates
their rights to religious freedom because, while they are religiously
opposed to the use of birth control, the mandate requires them to
provides their employees access to birth control through employerprovided insurance. My argument focuses on the constitutionality
of the HHS mandate and the importance of the mandate remaining
in effect without expanding its religious exemptions. The HHS contraceptives mandate is essential to the advancement of civil liberties and the balancing of religious and secular rights and interests of
Americans. The HHS contraceptives mandate is permissible within
the guidelines of the U.S. Constitution without providing exemptions for religious institutions because the U.S. government has a
compelling interest in ensuring that preventive healthcare such as
contraceptives is available and affordable.

I. Religion
The Bill of Rights guarantees basic rights and liberties to individual citizens, and those institutionalized protections for individuals prevent abuses by ruling majorities and powerful, large
institutions.7 Religions come in all shapes and sizes, but there are
certainly religions large and powerful enough to have political sway
in the public square and significant influence in the private realms of
individuals’ lives. The Bill of Rights, and the principles of individual
rights that it represents and guarantees, indicates a concern—held at
the time of the United States’ founding—that the rights of individuals are vulnerable to abuse by influential organizations.
The role of religion in society has evolved such that religions in
21st century America have different spheres of influence than they
did in 1781. In the late 18th century, religions played the societal role
of distilling religious ideas and promoting moral principles. Religion
7
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is now a profitable industry.8 Essentially, a definition limiting “religion” to an ideology or a set of beliefs would greatly misrepresent
the presence of religion in modern society. In addition to ecclesiastical
capacities, many religions have developed various ministries that influence, often beneficially, their communities. These ministries can
be organizations that are affiliated with or perhaps even owned or
operated by a particular religion, but they would not be considered
institutions teaching a religious idea or promoting a moral principle.
For example, the Catholic Church, in addition to operating religious
worship services, also operates universities, hospitals, and charities.
While these institutions’ respective purposes are related to the religious goals of the Catholic Church, they serve a much broader role
in their communities: for instance, they provide healthcare services,
education opportunities, needed relief for the less fortunate, and employment for skilled healthcare providers and talented educators.9
The increased presence of religiously affiliated organizations in
a pluralistic society has complicated the relationship between the
religious and the secular. Some employers religiously opposed to
contraceptives do not want to enable behaviors they find sinful—in
the case of the HHS mandate, by being required to provide insurance that covers contraceptives.10 However, these employers wish to
broaden the influence of religious institutions beyond Constitutional
bounds. Religious institutions are still free to teach from the pulpit
why people should not use contraceptives and encourage adherence
to that standard. Religious objections to contraceptives vary, but in
the case of the Catholic religion, the Catechism teaches that sexual-
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ity is for procreative and unitive purposes” only.11 Other faiths take
issue specifically with contragestives, medications that end pregnancies up to seven weeks after conception. As religions or affiliated organizations adopt roles beyond teaching religious doctrines
or promoting moral principles, religious organizations’ influence
broadens. These institutions may even gain influence over persons
not part of the faith. Influence alone is not inherently a problem, but
organizations with influence require checks on their relationships,
especially power relationships between individuals such as healthcare providers and healthcare recipients. In Bollard v. Cal. Province
of the Soc’y of Jesus, in 1999, the Ninth Circuit held that churches
should not be “free from all of the secular legal obligations that currently and routinely apply to them.”12 There is debate over which
secular obligations do not apply to religious institutions, and there
is precedent for courts ruling in favor of religious expression13 and
precedent for courts limiting religious expression.14 Even as early as
1878, Chief Justice Waite, writing for the majority opinion, argued
that the First Amendment protections for religion applied strictly to
religious beliefs, not religious actions.15 Religions are voluntary organizations that adherents can join or leave at their leisure. Religious
organizations that fill secular roles in society, on the other hand, are
not voluntary to the same degree. A patient in a hospital bed or a hospital employee dependent on a paycheck might not have the flexibility to select their hospital based on its religious affiliation. Because
the role of religion in society has evolved and religiously affiliated
11
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institutions fill so many roles in their communities, the interests of
the individuals involved need systemic protection, and some restriction of religious liberties in order to protect those interests is therefore justified.

II. Benefits of the Mandate
The HHS mandate has established medical standards that require
insurance providers and employers to cover the cost of contraceptives
even though such actions may conflict with insurers’ or employers’
religious values, but this is not unprecedented in the healthcare industry. To illustrate the conflict that arises between parties with opposing interests, consider the case of an EMT that adheres to the
Jehovah’s Witness faith—a religion that proscribes life-saving blood
transfusion procedures. An emergency responder must get a patient
to a doctor for a blood transfusion if a patient requires the procedure
regardless of her or his beliefs, and an employer required to provide
contraceptive coverage in an insurance plan must do so regardless
of the employer’s personal convictions about the morality of contraceptive use. Compare the patient in this analogy to the employees
of religiously affiliated institutions. In the example of a blood transfusion, the need to guarantee a certain availability of healthcare to
the patient transcends any religious objection the EMT may have
to contributing in any way to the procedure. Similarly, the need for
citizens to have access to resources that enable them to plan and
schedule pregnancy should not be hindered by the religious beliefs of
their employer. Applying this case to healthcare more generally supports the conclusion that the right to a certain standard of quality in
healthcare provision trumps the right to religious expression in one’s
occupation. By this logic, HHS may mandate that even religiously
opposed parties must provide contraceptive coverage in their insurance policies.
In making policy decisions about quality healthcare, government officials should seek to implement legislation in accordance
with recommendations from field experts on the best medical practices. Lawmakers ought to seek the best means available to meet
the needs of the population. All persons deserve protections of their
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rights under the law, including religious rights, but values among
a population are diverse; it is not possible for the laws of the land
to perfectly reflect the values of all of the people. Elected officials
make decisions they believe to be in the interests of most, while simultaneously working to protect the interests of the minority. As
lawmakers make decisions about healthcare, their primary source
for trusted counsel should be medical experts rather than whims of
popular opinion.16
Medical professionals agree that access to contraceptives greatly
improves women’s ability to exercise societal autonomy and economic stability.17 A woman’s ability to be in control of her own life
depends strongly on her ability to control when she has children.
In turn, family units that practice family planning can still have
children but can time the births according to the needs of the family. A recent report from the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended that girls of all ages should have access to emergency
contraception,18 and New York’s court of appeals recognized that
providing access to preventive care products such as birth control
is just as vital a role of insurance coverage as is providing access to
prescription medications.19 HHS was acting under the recommendations resulting from research conducted by medical professionals in
order to improve the health and general well being of women and
their families in the United States.20
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III. Constitutionality
There are two tests currently dominant in judicial review for
evaluation of whether laws impose acceptable limitations or regulations on constitutional religious freedoms. The first is the Lemon
Test, which is a three-part test. The second is the Smith test, a threepart test that is more prevalent in recent judicial review as it is more
recently developed. The HHS mandate passes both of these constitutionality tests.
First is the Lemon Test. The Lemon was developed by the majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971 for testing whether a
law violates the First Amendment’s protections for religious liberties. Part one of the Lemon Test is that any law or government action that establishes a religion or suppresses religious expression
must have a significant secular purpose.21 The HHS contraceptives
mandate is clearly an effort of the government to enable women and
their respective sexual partners to have more ability to control the
reproductive system through preventive health measures. This promotes economic stability by preventing unplanned pregnancies that
will result in costly procedures such as a abortions or pre-natal and
delivery care, as well as allowing women to plan when they will be
pregnant—a condition that has many consequences on workplace
abilities and decisions.
The second part of the Lemon Test is that the law or action must
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.22
Since the primary effect of the HHS mandate is giving women and
their sexual partners the ability to plan parenthood responsibly, the
mandate does not advance any religion’s agenda, nor does it prevent
any religion from expressing its beliefs and promoting practice of
the faith. The mandate grants citizens access to a preventive medical
care product, and it does not force any persons to use the product in
a way contrary to their political or religious beliefs.
The third hurdle that a law or government action must overcome
in order to meet the requirements of the Lemon Test is that the stat21
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ute may not result in an excessive entanglement of government with
religion.23 The HHS mandate clearly does not force the government
into a situation where state officials must define religious institution’s values. Some opponents of the HHS mandate have suggested
that religious institutions should be granted an exemption from the
requirements. This alternative would actually result in more entanglement between government and religion than requiring all institutions, religious or otherwise, to fulfill the mandate or pay the fine
because the government would then have to decide which institutions could or could not receive an exemption, requiring the government to evaluate each institution’s individual claim to a right to the
religious exemption.
The Smith test is derived from the opinion of Justice Scalia in
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith. The ruling requires that if
there is a question of whether a law violates religious liberties, the
state must show that the law is generally applicable and neutral on its
face and that the law does not simultaneously limit rights other than
religious liberty rights.24
The HHS mandate is generally applicable and facially neutral.
The mandate, with limited exemptions for religions,25 raises the
minimum quality standard of healthcare that insurance plans must
provide. Religions, private citizens, corporations, and other entities
are subject to the mandate if they have employees, and all insurance
companies are under an equal obligation to include coverage for contraceptives.
The second measurement the Smith Test takes into account is
that a law or government action must be facially neutral.26 The mandate does not promote any distinction based on religion, so it easily
satisfies this requirement of the Smith Test.
The third and final part of the Smith test is that more strict
scrutiny applies if the government action or law infringes on any
23
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rights or liberties other than religious ones. There are no other rights
infringed by the contraceptives coverage requirement in the HHS
mandate, so the mandate passes this part of the test, and thus the
entire Smith Test.

IV. Conclusion
In this article I have shown how the expansion of religions and
increasing diversity in the United States has resulted in the evolution
of religious institutions. When these religious institutions take upon
themselves the role of an employer, they should be subject to many
of the same constraints and obligations as secular institutions in society. I have shown that the HHS mandate will promote the general
welfare of the people in the United States and greatly improve the
social and economic opportunities and stability of women and their
families. Finally, I have shown that the HHS mandate is constitutional in that it withstands the scrutiny of contemporary constitutional
tests. For these reasons, I conclude that the HHS mandate is a step
forward for human rights and for healthcare standards in the United
States and recommend that the courts considering the suits challenging the mandate rule in favor of Health and Human Services.

Updating Copyright: Capitalizing on Digital
Opportunities
Jordan Call1

“D

igital theft is killing the music business,” proclaims
MusicUnited.org in an online petition. “It is destroying
jobs, opportunities and careers. Songwriters, artists,
musicians and vocalists, retailers, distributors, labels and publishers
are all at risk, as is the unique culture of American music itself.”2
These are strong words, but after all, “digital theft” has become
somewhat of an epidemic—the New York Times reports that as of
2010, 95 percent of downloaded music worldwide is pirated.3 It is
hard not to sympathize with the plight of the artist or publisher. They
are working hard to provide the public with culture and entertainment, but it seems that they have caught a terminal disease and are
hemorrhaging at an alarming rate. That disease has been a direct
result of the internet.
The internet allows for an unprecedented dissemination of information, as well as incredible means of connecting people worldwide.
One would think that this would make the internet one of the best
1
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Music United for Strong Internet Copyright, http://www.musicunited.
org/ (last visited Jan, 1. 2013).
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Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Counts the Cost of Piracy, N. Y. Times (Jan.
21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/global/22music.
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things that ever happened to an industry whose aim is essentially
the creation and circulation of art and entertainment (or even more
abstractly, ideas and their expression). While no one would deny that
the internet has afforded many opportunities to artists and publishers, there seems to be a feeling that things were better before the
pernicious internet became as “the Boston strangler is to the woman
home alone.”4
The internet has had an inestimable impact on how easily and
frequently people engage in piracy. In most cases, there is little
ambiguity regarding the illegality of the downloading, uploading,
ripping, burning, and sharing that the modern consumer engages
in; however, I submit that the laws preventing piracy and sharing
are the actual source of societal detriment, rather than piracy and
sharing themselves. These laws inhibit a potentially more efficient
copyright system, and society could benefit by their revision. In this
article, I will argue that the digital revolution, in its virtual freedom
from scarcity, is being stunted by the stigma of current copyright
regulations. I will demonstrate that revising the law to allow private
reproduction and distribution in the case of digital media would do
more good than harm to creative output, as well as advance the aims
of copyright outlined in the Constitution. I will further demonstrate
that in the absence of the vending of digital files, other economic
factors will provide sufficient incentive to further the art and entertainment industries, while benefiting society through greater access
and use.

I. Legal Considerations
To understand why current copyright law is stunting rather than
encouraging progress from a digital perspective requires an under4

Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R.
4794 H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti,
MPAA) (Jack Valenti’s famous analogy of what the VCR—with relatively
tame copyright infringement capabilities compared to the world wide
web—was to the “American film producer and the American public”).
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standing of the state of copyright law and where it comes from, as
well as an understanding of the nature of digital media and how it
interacts with the law.
First, the law itself. Discussion of copyright is often focused on
how to balance the rights of users with the rights of creators to find
an optimal outcome.5 Unfortunately, it is usually the case that the
expansion of one of these party’s rights results in a reduction of the
other’s. If an artist were given complete power to restrict use, he or
she would be able to exclusively capture the benefits of his or her
work, thereby increasing the cost of access and limiting public use.
Conversely, if every creative work were public domain, it would be
difficult for the producer of the work to capitalize on his or her creation, despite widespread use. This issue may be framed in terms
of “thick” or “thin” copyright.6 The former seeks to “maximize
profits” for copyright holders.7 The latter, a “minimalist approach
to copyright,” attempts to maximize accessibility and public rights
by providing copyright holders with as little protection as possible
while still giving them incentive to create. Finding the appropriate
point along the continuum is difficult and is central to the purpose of
this paper. The search for this point must begin with certain groundfloor assumptions that depend on one’s interpretation of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”8
5

Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Law, 139-143 (2d ed. 2006).

6

Karen Coyle, Talk at the Library of Congress: The Technology of Rights:
Digital Rights Management (Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://www.
kcoyle.net/drm_basics1.html. (This dichotomy could also be set up as
the tension between “fair use” and “creator rights,” or the interests of the
“public” versus “private,” spheres, etc. For consistency’s sake, this article
will primarily describe the different parties as “consumers” and “producers/creators,” the former referring to anyone and everyone who would
benefit from the goods that the “producer/creator” either creates, supplies,
or publishes).

7

Id.

8

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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The “thick” and “thin” debate encapsulates the different approaches taken towards this passage. One political commentator
captures the thinking behind the “thick” approach:
The Constitution says that the purpose of patents and copyright is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”
but the fact that the Constitution says this doesn’t mean it’s
the only reason to grant patents and copyrights . . . creators
have a moral right to profit from their works.9
Those who take this view argue that copyright is a moral right for
creators. But, however valid this idea may seem, this argument puts
words in the mouths of the framers of the Constitution. Talk of morality is conspicuously absent in the Copyright Clause.
The other interpretation maintains that copyright’s purpose
is progress, rather than protecting a “Lockean” idea of property
rights.10 This debate is admittedly ideological and largely subjective,
but this assertion more closely follows the wording of the Constitution and is thus a more compelling argument. Oberholzer-Gee and
Strumpf, professors of business at Harvard and Kansas University
respectively, hold that “weaker copyright is unambiguously desirable if it does not lessen the incentives of artists and entertainment
companies to produce new works.”11 Jessica Litman maintains that
the use of copyrighted works is what ultimately matters.12 The Constitution’s stated reason for copyright—the progress of art and

9

Kevin Drum, Authors Have a Moral Right to Profit from Their Works,
Mother Jones Blog (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.motherjones.
com.

10

Gonna Do It Anyway, Even if It Doesn’t Pay, The Economist Blog (Feb.
16, 2012, 6:37 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/02/copyright.

11

Felix Oberholzer Gee, File Sharing and Copyright, Innovation
Policy and the Econ. (2010), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605852.

12

Jessica D. Litman, Lawful Personal Use (Univ. of Mich. Program in Law
and Econ. Archive: 2003-2009, Working Paper No. 62, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps-olin/art62/.
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science13—centers upon the benefit to society that such rights will
provide. Thus, copyright becomes nothing more than a means to an
end rather than an end in itself (the end being progress). This assertion will be foundational in this pursuit of the correct balance
between creator rights and public rights.
Furthermore, if there is anything to be gained by changing copyright law, then the new policy must be in harmony with the Constitution. It is helpful to first identify the essential components of the
Copyright Clause: “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added).14 The first and most vital element of this clause is that any
policy that can claim to be Constitutional must necessarily “promote
progress”—a deceptively simple phrase. The second essential element, the part about the “exclusive right” to a work, also requires
interpretation. As a starting point, I offer a basic interpretation of
this clause: copyright law must (1) encourage capable people to produce “useful” works by (2) granting and protecting rights as copyright holders that will (3) bring them reimbursement proportional
to the perceived value that they create. Put more simply, copyright
laws must give producers incentive to produce. Copyright law cannot merely be evaluated in terms of the effect that it will have on one
party or another, but must necessarily assess the net effect on both
the creators and the users, as well as American society at large. If
the purpose of law is to benefit society, then a new legal balance of
rights that increase or maximize the net benefit to society ought to
be adopted as law.
The current legislative attitude towards copyright is best observed in the Copyright Act of 1976. This Act is the piece of legislation that has most directly governed copyright law for the last several
decades. A marked improvement upon its predecessor, the Copyright
13

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

14

Id. Much of the history of copyright law has dealt with the duration of
copyright. See, e.g., Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 108
(2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006). The matter of duration is somewhat tangential to the current topic and thus will not be treated here.
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Act of 1909,15 the 1976 Act clarified and codified the rights of copyright holders. It also protected certain public rights by including
provisions for “fair use.” This Act established the general flavor of
copyright law to this day, and subsequent legislation,16 amendments,
and court decisions17 have generally fallen in line with this Constitutional interpretation.
At the heart of the Copyright Act lies its enumeration of the six
exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder, which are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.18
These rights are granted for a period of life plus 70 years (subject to renewal),19 and any violation of these rights during the term
of copyright is termed “infringement.”20 Authors’ rights are limited
most significantly in two ways: first, by the aforementioned “fair
15

Gorman, supra note 4, at 2 (“The Copyright Act that dominated the twentieth century was enacted in 1909. Inartfully drafted and lacking important
definitions—and enacted before the invention or widespread commercial
use of the phonograph, motion pictures, radio and television . . . was
subject to frequent ad hoc amendment and to unguided judicial interpretation.”)

16

See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006);
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (2006). Technology,
Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. § 110
(2002).

17

See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S.; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005).

18

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006).

19

Id.

20

17 U.S.C. § 501 (2011).
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use” exceptions, which grant the public rights in various contexts,
such as scholarship, parody, review, criticism, etc., especially when
that which is utilized is incidental or minimal.21 More importantly,
only the “expression” of ideas is protected, and not the ideas themselves.22 The first reason for this is that ideas are nearly impossible to
protect. The second reason is that impeding the flow of ideas would
be detrimental. The nature of ideas, discoveries, and art is such that
it moves forward incrementally; each creator owes a debt to those
creators who preceded him or her.23 If ideas became property, it
might threaten the creative progress, which would defeat entirely the
purpose mentioned in the Copyright Clause.

II. The Possibilities and Legal “Challenges” of Digital
Technology
Now to examine the nature of digital media, in order to see if
a more efficient balance could be struck between creator rights and
public rights. The internet age has brought significant changes to
innumerable facets of human life, and copyright considerations are
no exception. These changes have brought with them great opportunities relating to creativity, art, and scholarship. However, because
of current copyright law, many of these opportunities appear to be
challenges, since a large portion of their applications are against the
law as it stands today. If the law were revised to better fit the nature
of digital media, society could legally benefit from the vast opportunities afforded. Specifically, the Copyright Act should be revised
by eliminating the exclusive reproduction and distribution rights
granted to copyright holders in the case of digital media.
The opportunities the internet provides to the fields of the arts
and sciences are numerous. First, computers bring the process of
21

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5564.

22

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).

23

See generally Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff
Economy. (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
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recording and editing media such as music and film into the home.
This facilitates authorship by making the creative process less expensive and more convenient, which lowers the barriers for amateurs
and professionals alike to engage in creative acts. For example, there
are on average 72 hours of video uploaded on Youtube every minute,
and much of it is amateur and recorded on relatively inexpensive
devices such as webcams.24 This easy accessibility enriches the creative output in society.
Another great advantage that digital files have over material
works is that they can be reproduced and distributed at virtually no
cost. This unlimited reproducibility has a remarkable effect: namely,
scarcity virtually ceases to be one of the economic factors governing these goods. Furthermore, as these reproduced files can be distributed across the world almost instantly from servers to clients
via the internet, many other costs associated with sharing ideas and
media—such as packaging, shipping, and storing—are reduced or
eliminated.
Unfortunately, current copyright law restricts public engagement in these activities.25 When the Copyright Act of 1976 grants
copyright holders the right to “to reproduce the copyrighted work . . .
[and] distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending,”26 it either outlaws many of the most useful functions
of digital technology entirely, or, if it does allow them, it adds unnecessary costs, as users must seek and/or pay for permission to do
reproduce or distribute a work, requiring time and money.27
Herein lies one of the “challenges” that digital technology has
presented to the law: more opportunities for infringement, also
known as “piracy.” The statistics on piracy are stunning.28 Not only
24

Statistics, Youtube, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics.

25

Gorman, supra note 4 at 99-119.

26

17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2011).

27

Id. § 204.

28

See generally Hendrik Schulze & Klaus Mochalski, Internet Study
2008/2009, Ipoque (2009), http://www.ipoque.com/sites/default/files/mediafiles/documents/internet-study-2008-2009.pdf.
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is it easier than ever before to reproduce and distribute a work, it is
also extremely difficult to police such actions on a significant scale.29
Deterrence through increasing the likelihood of retribution is impractical on such a large scale (and raises concerns about privacy
rights),30 which has instead led courts to rely on severe, messagesending punishments that are arguably out of proportion with the
nature of the crime.31
Piracy may seem malicious, but it also appears to be here to stay.
Psychologically, piracy is simply more permissible than stealing in
the minds of many.32 In fact, those who declare piracy as equivalent
to stealing are at odds with the Supreme Court: in Dowling v United
States in 1985, the Court stated that piracy “does not easily equate
with theft, conversion, or fraud.”33 The Court affirms an attitude that
pervades digital culture by stating that piracy, while perhaps ethically questionable, does not share the same moral stigma as theft. In
fact, it demonstrates a sort of moral and psychological loophole in
public thinking—however hard the entertainment industry tries to
equate the two practices, more people are willing to download a CD

29

Dave Lee, A Glimpse at Piracy in the UK and Beyond, BBC News, (Sep.
16, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19599527.

30

ACTA Up, The Economist, Feb. 11, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21547235

31

See Capitol v. Thomas, 692 F.3d 899; (8th Cir. filed Sept. 11 2012). The
defendant Jammie Thomas Rasset was ordered to pay sums ranging from
$54,000 dollars to $1.92 million after appeals for the infringement of 24
songs.

32

Kanika Tandon Bhal & Nivedita D. Leekha, Exploring Cognitive Moral
Logics Using Grounded Theory: The Case of Software Piracy, 81 J.
of Bus. Ethics 635, 635-646; (2008) available at http://www.jstor.org/
stable/25482242.

33
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than actually steal it.34 For whatever reason, enough people choose to
pirate virtual media that any attempt at rigorous enforcement would
be impractical.
As neither internal morals nor external enforcement are sufficient to prevent it, a great deal of music ends up in consumer hands
without passing through a channel that will reimburse the copyright
holder. Thus, in practice, the system established in the Copyright Act
fails to ensure the result that the Constitution requires. In effect, the
strict provisions of the Act become something that amounts to legal
deadweight, which, while failing to secure its intended benefits for
artistic creators, still manages to promote costly litigation, preserve
an obsolete economic system, and condemn millions of otherwise
law-abiding Americans.
As long as current legal attitudes towards copyright prevail,
technology and the law will remain at odds in this regard. This tension was created by an attempt to apply old law to new media, while
simply ignoring the fact that these are not analogous in important
ways. The provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 that deal with
reproduction and distribution are products of the time in which the
Act was drafted; this is manifested in the fact that their intent is
to protect objects. Current copyright law regarding distribution and
reproduction makes sense in the case of physical materials, because
materials, shipping, and transportation are costly. Copyright law
gives publishers an incentive to assume these costs by protecting
their rights to profit from that physical work. However, in the case of
digital media, just about anybody can become a “publisher,” because
the costs are minimal, requiring only a computer and an internet
connection.
The irony is that all the law must do to solve its digital “problem”
is in fact to embrace it. This could be accomplished by legalizing
34

See Julian Sanchez, How Copyright Industries Con Congress, Cato
Institute (Jan. 3, 2012, 2:07 PM) http://www.cato.org/blog/how-copyrightindustries-con-congress; Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, How Much Do
Music and Movie Piracy Really Hurt the U.S. Economy? Freakonomics
(Jan 12, 2012, 3:09 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/01/12/howmuch-do-music-and-movie-piracy-really-hurt-the-u-s-economy; ACTA
Up, supra note 29.
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private, personal reproduction and distribution (hereinafter referred
to as “sharing”). As digital media effectively eliminates the problem
of scarcity, the public is being presented with incredible opportunities. Theoretically, global culture and its accompanying art and
entertainment could be as broadly accessible as the internet itself!
The social implications are staggering—American culture need not
be available only in proportion to one’s means; once the fixed cost
of internet access is met, the marginal gains could be enormous.
Furthermore, copying and sharing promote the advancement of
the arts, which advancement has both a component of creation and
scale of use and access.35 Increasing the amount of legal sharing that
takes place would foster scholarship and creativity by broadening
the scope of the conversation, as it were. Both self-expression and
scholarship heavily involve an engagement with the work of others.
If more artists and creative minds were connected to each other, and
more people had more access to the discourse, creativity would likely increase.36

III. Ensuring Creativity: Economic Considerations
While the benefits of relaxing copyright law are apparent, they
are only half of the picture. Copyright law is a balance between the
interests of two specific parties, and we have yet to examine how
such a move would affect the people who are responsible for the benefits of the “Science and Useful Arts”: the creators themselves. It is
important that revisions to copyright law be made without regard to
the vested interests of particular business and consumer groups and
instead be assessed by its consequences for efficiency in markets for
creative works.37 That being said, no amount of public right expan35

See Litman, supra note 11, at 29, 30. To illustrate with the inverse, if
someone cannot access (directly or indirectly) a work, does it matter to
them whether or not that work exists in the first place?

36

Kirby Ferguson, Everything is a Remix. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.everythingisaremix.info.

37

See Nathan Musick, Copyright Issues in Digital Media (Juyne Linger et
al. eds., 2004), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps66530/0809-Copyright.pdf.
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sion would be worth the extinction of authors and the works that
they would have created. Before applying these proposed changes,
then, one must investigate their potential impact on authors. While
it is impossible to know exactly, broad trends give a good indication
of what this impact would be, and the results are somewhat surprising. Granted, it is difficult to determine whether or not there is an
“optimal” (i.e., economically efficient) amount of creative works, but
it appears that even without the right to restrict sharing, incentives
would remain sufficiently high to ensure great quantity, quality, and
variety in creative output. This is because there are many factors
besides sharing rights that provide incentive to create.
As long as art is costly to produce, basic economic theory asserts
that there must be compensation to give incentive to create. Fortunately, even without granting creators the rights to govern sharing,
the law can continue to provide incentive to create by protecting other
exclusive rights for copyright holders. If the law were revised to give
people freedom to exchange and share media privately, it could still
protect creators’ claims to authorship as well as their ability to control the commercial uses of their works. This is a comparatively easy
task which can yield huge gains for authors.38
The first commercial use that can mean great deals of money for
artists is associated with advertisement. Youtube,39 a media sensation, is a perfect example of how this might function. If an artist
releases their song or video on Youtube and chooses to monetize it
through advertising, the result can be lucrative. An article published
in Rolling Stone magazine reports that top artists may receive approximately $1 for every 1000 views through advertisements.40 Recently, an amateur “artist” made a video that included a song by
38

Jim Luke, Corporate Entitlements: Music Edition, EconProph Blog (May
30, 2011), http://econproph.com/2011/05/30/corporate-entitlements-music-edition/.

39

Lucas Hilderbrand, Youtube: Where Cultural Memory and Copyright
Converge, 61 Film Quarterly 48 (2007), available at http://www.jstor.
org/stable/10.1525/fq.2007.61.1.48.

40

Steve Knopper, The New Economics of the Music Industry, Rolling Stone
Mag. Oct. 25, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/music/
news/the-new-economics-of-the-music-industry-20111025.
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Chris Brown called “Forever.” When this article was published, this
amateur video had 70 million views. Instead of taking down the
video, Sony (the copyright holder for Brown’s song) took a cut of the
earnings, and Sony earned about $70,000 serendipitously, if Rolling
Stone estimates are correct.41 Thus, the incentive to create something
popular could still be great even without the profit from selling media like property because popular works are valuable to advertisers
who want to reach as many people as possible.
A different avenue of potential income is through commercial
licensing.42 For example, when a song is popular, companies want to
put it in commercials. A popular movie results in the sale of products
associated with its characters, setting, or story. As with advertising,
success gives incentive to piggyback, and the proposed relaxation
of regulation does not change the artist’s ability to control and profit
from such ventures.
Another possible means of artistic compensation is subscription:
if an artist only releases his or her media on a subscription-based
site, all those who access those works must pay some kind of entrance fee. Sites like Netflix offer access to television shows through
subscription.43 A variation of the subscription model is known as
“freemium,” which allows people to freely use basic versions of their
services with the option to pay a subscription fee for greater access.
This model is employed by media distribution companies like Spotify as well as companies that create software.44
These alternative models of revenue generation are not meant
to be mutually exclusive; rather, they function in tandem to provide
41

Id.

42

Online Software Piracy: Head in the Clouds, The Economist Blog
(July 25, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/07/online-software-piracy.

43

Greg Bensinger, Netflix Shares Surge 35% on Profit, Wall St. J., Jan. 24,
2013, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788
7324039504578260182003808560.html.

44

See Katherine Heires, Why It Pays to Give Away the Store, Bus. 2.0, Oct.
1, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2006/10/01/8387115/index.htm.
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incentives for an artist or publisher. Indeed, all of these approaches
have promising elements in common. They are internet-intuitive,
capitalizing on the vast network’s ability to connect people and
ideas on a vast scale. The openness of the model based on advertising would give less incentive to infringe, which would result in a
compensation ratio that is closer to 1:1. One of the major drawbacks
of the “property” system of copyright protection in the context of
digital media is that it encourages freeloading, which may result in a
low compensation ratio for the artist and produce an inefficient and
less-than-ideal outcome.
To adopt these systems as the primary means of compensation
for artists may have implications that initially feel uncomfortable:
will artists cease to make music available for regular sale in favor
of music made for licensing, subscription, and advertisement-driven
sites? Will the public be able to “own” media any longer, or will they
be tied to a view-by-view system? The answer to these questions
may be yes; however, not only is this outcome more fair than expecting creators to allow the public to freeload, it is also a more beneficial system in the long run. Discounting an idea solely because it is a
paradigm shift is short-sighted and ultimately detrimental.
On the other hand, allowing users to share digital media may not
necessarily prevent an artist from making his or her work available
to own and share. Publicity can create value, after all. When asked
about the effect that piracy had on his income, one artist stated the
following:
I sell a lot of tickets. I’ve sold 1.2 million albums, and the
stat [sic] is that there’s 8 million downloads of that as well illegally . . . Nine million people have my record, in England,
which is quite a nice feeling . . . I’m still selling albums, but
I’m selling tickets at the same time. My gig tickets are like
£18, and my albums £8, so...it’s all relative.45
In the case of music, a “viral” song could function less as an item to
be sold and more as a contagious form of advertisement that could
lead to profits.
45

Lee, supra note 28.
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Certainly, there are alternatives to pretending that digital media
can function only as tangible property to be bought and sold, and
these alternatives can provide incentive to create a work that will become popular and in high demand. This incentive is precisely what
the Constitution requires and prescribes.
Finally, the “progress of the useful arts and sciences” may not
rely quite as much upon rights-based incentives as one may think.
There has been much commentary on the phenomenon of Wikipedia, an open-source encyclopedia that runs entirely on the creative
and scholarly works of volunteers.46 These volunteers receive neither
compensation nor recognition, yet the site thrives with 24 million
free articles.47 The amount of creative contribution is astounding and
seems to belie economic principles. Another example of this economic paradox can be seen in the highly competitive fields of careers
in the arts. For example, BLS.gov reports that “many musicians and
singers find only part-time or intermittent work and have long periods of unemployment between jobs.”48 Despite this, “there should be
strong competition for jobs because of the large number of workers
who are interested in becoming musicians and singers.”49 While it is
true that some musicians, authors, filmmakers, etc., make great deals
of money, the chances of any one person being able to do so are very

46

Wikipedia:About, Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About
(last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (As of Jan. 14, Wikipedia reports 586,936,117
edits on the website, 18,250,367 registered users who can actively edit
pages. They are all doing this free of charge with no financial benefit to
themselves. Questions of reliability aside, this reflects a staggering of
creative work done for free).

47

Wikipedia, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.
php?title=Wikipedia (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).

48

Bureau of Lab. Stat., http://www.bls.gov/ooh/entertainment-and-sports/
musicians-and-singers.htm

49

See id.
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small. That lottery’s chance of success would also be present in the
alternative economic models described here.50
Any explanation as to why people choose to contribute to the
arts and sciences with little to no compensation would be merely
speculative and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this behavior is a reality, and it suggests that whatever decrease in incentive
that might result from legal copyright change would not be overly
detrimental to creative output.

IV. Conclusion: The Big Picture
The Constitution provides that the law protect certain rights
for authors so that art, science, entertainment, and scholarship will
progress. The current codified interpretation in the Copyright Act
of 1976 is problematic and outdated in the sense that it erroneously
treats digital works the same as it treats works that are inherently
more tangible. This policy is easy to abuse and difficult to enforce.
The internet is at once largely responsible for these abuses and the
provider of an incredible opportunity because it can virtually free
us from scarcity in many cases. This freedom could lead to an incredible expansion of intellectual and creative progress: greater accessibility means that as a work’s benefit to society increases, the
intellectual/creative conversation becomes more widespread and
democratic, and media becomes a socially equalizing force. This
could be accomplished by expanding the existing definition “fair
use” to allow for private reproduction and distribution. The biggest
potential drawback of such a move is the decrease of incentive for
artists and authors to produce creative works; however, the internet
itself allows many other ways to monetize creative endeavor in the
absence of vending—not to mention the fact that there seem to be
50

Even if perhaps the odds become slightly slimmer or the “jackpot”
reduces somewhat without the right to sell digital files, it seems unlikely
that this will greatly affect people’s perception of the potential upside and
likely downside of pursuing a creative path. In other words, the difference
between “1 in a million” and “1 in 1.37 million” would probably have
a negligible effect on people’s perception of the opportunities of the industry, both situations being likely to be perceived as “very small.”
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other compelling factors besides monetary compensation that drive
people to create. Since this proposed change would most likely leave
plenty of incentive to innovate, it is Constitutional as well as economically and socially beneficial.
The actions of the general population support the idea that media
“sharing” is not as insidious as it is often portrayed. Otherwise lawabiding people have been known to engage in copyright infringement despite commercials, piracy warnings, and lectures attempting
to persuade them that sharing is as wrong as stealing and that it is destroying the art and entertainment industry. While this might make
the offending parties feel a bit guilty or vaguely nervous about being
caught, it appears that many people do not seem to find such arguments all that convincing, perhaps because they subconsciously realize that their actions may not be as detrimental as anti-sharers might
think. Sharers continue to participate in the revolutionary new sharing culture that has emerged with the internet. One might expect that
an age of unprecedented piracy would coincide with a sharp decline
in creative endeavors, but this does not appear to be the case. This
generation seems to match or even surpass any other in terms of the
quality, quantity, and variety of creative endeavor.51 The law would
do well to recognize this and should update policy accordingly.
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See generally Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organization (Penguin Books, 2009).

Soft-Power Triangulation for the Reclamation
of a Prodigal Free Press
Maren Mildenhall1
“Our country, if you read the ‘Federalist Papers,’ is about disagreement. It’s about pitting faction against faction, divided government, checks and balances.”
Jonah Goldberg

C

hecks and balances form the backing within which American
legal tradition is ensconced; ever-shifting, yet immovable by
the same token. The ink in every jot of new legislation is diffused with that of codes already penned: none arise without regard
to where they fit in with the body of established code. No law is an
island. All are designed to work in unison to safeguard the essential
rights of the citizens they serve.
That intricate interplay is in present jeopardy. The circumstances
surrounding news coverage of the Zimmerman trial reveal an unprecedented pervasiveness of new forms of media that poses a dramatic
potential threat to the rights of those accused of serious crimes. Lay
citizens in possession of a little knowledge may broadcast their mis1
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interpretation of misplaced details to thousands of Twitter followers,
Facebook friends, or enthusiasts of a given cause for an instant riot.
The advent of social media has turned news reportage into a game
of telephone in which any bias or inaccuracy is magnified by biased,
inaccurate repetition by those with no obligation to be detached and
objective. The broad discretion necessarily granted the news media
to report the facts without flagrant contempt of factuality threatens
conflict with the principle underlying Blackstone’s formulation of innocence until proof of guilt. By blackening the name of the accused
with the power of widely dispersed suggestion, the pool from which
an impartial jury may be drawn is narrowed dramatically. This, in
turn, effectively diverts the course of a trial by appealing to that very
mob whose tide must be stemmed. While the repercussions of this
[mis]information explosion are not yet known, it is in the best interest of the American legal system that the federal government should
establish some mainstay to preserve the rights of those accused of
malfeasance which have come under probable threat.
Although the framers of the Constitution could not possibly have
foreseen such a remedy, the country needs a moderator of sorts; some
agent to provide metacognition for the cogitating factions. Thus, it
is proposed that a nonpartisan media watchdog agency comprised of
well-established, well-reputed veteran newsmen be organized to establish a set of straightforward, navigable guidelines governing the
code of integrity by which news agencies (as well as the moderating
agency, itself) should be held by the public (if not by the very law
which guarantees its autonomy). Focusing on the Zimmerman trial,
this article will explore the ways in which mass media jeopardizes
the right to a fair trial. Its needless injection of high-profile cases
with ideological tension calls for the use of soft power to accomplish
what hard power cannot and must not.
On March 19, 2012, NBC reporter Jeff Burnside issued a report
to the effect that an armed neighborhood watchman named George
Zimmerman had, after a period spent following 17-year-old Trayvon
Martin down a residential sidewalk, slain said teenager because he
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suspected him of being a “black guy up to no good.”2 A recording
of the gunman’s conversation with a 911 operator just prior to the
accident, aired on Today on March 27, was doctored by Burnside to
give the impression that Zimmerman had equated the state of being
“up to no good” with the condition of being black and had chosen to
follow Martin on that premise.3
That Zimmerman was let off on a plea of self-defense was thus
crafted to serve as evidence of institutional racism in the Sanford,
Florida police department. The general public raised a great hue
and cry when Martin’s parents circulated a petition on Change.org
calling for Zimmerman’s prosecution;4 and a Florida state attorney
brought charges a month later. Numerous celebrities took to Twitter
to publicly lament Martin’s demise and issue a call for racial justice.5
Reverent Al Sharpton cited Martin’s death as proof of systematic
racism in the U.S.6 Representative Bobby Rush donned a hoodie and

2

NBC6 Zimmerman Edit Explanation, NBC6 (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/NBC6-Zimmerman-EditExplanation-148961305.html.

3

Jeff Burnside, NBC Miami WTVJ Reporter, Fired Over Edited George
Zimmerman 911 Call, Huffington Post (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/25/jeff-burnside-nbc-miami-wtvj-firedgeorge-zimmerman-edited_n_1453679.html.

4

Tracy Martin & Sabrina Fulton, Prosecute the Killer of Our Son, 17-YearOld Trayvon Martin, change.org (Apr. 2012), http://www.change.org/
petitions/prosecute-the-killer-of-our-son-17-year-old-trayvon-martin.
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Crystal Bell, Trayvon Martin Celebrity Reactions: Spike Lee, Sherri
Shepherd React to Florida Teen’s Death, Huffington Post (Mar. 23,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/trayvon-martincelebrity-reactions-shooting_n_1376065.html.
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Al Sharpton at Trayvon Martin Rally: “We are Tired of Going to Jail
for Nothing and Others Going Home for Something,” Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/al-sharpton-trayvon-martinrally_n_1374975.html (last updated Mar. 23, 2012, 9:24 AM).
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sunglasses to speak to other House members about racial profiling.7
President Obama made the statement that his son would “look like
Trayvon.”8 “Justice for Trayvon” is now the rallying cry of thousands
who hold vigils,9 wear hoodies,10 and march11 in his memory. Before
it even got off the ground, the Zimmerman case was racially and
politically charged practically to the point of no return.
Whether or not Zimmerman truly guilty is not the point being
argued here. The profound trouble with the Zimmerman case and
how it has been presented to the public is that pathos has been at the
forefront of the issue from the very beginning.

I. The Growth of the Power of the News Media
Although constitutional rights are necessarily “coequal” in that
no single right may be permitted to override or submerge another,”12
the rights protected under the First Amendment are explicitly given a

7

Lucy Madison, Dem Rep. Bobby Rush Escorted from House Floor for
Wearing Hoodie in Honor of Trayvon Martin, CBS News (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57405846-503544/dem-repbobby-rush-escorted-from-house-floor-for-wearing-hoodie-in-honor-oftrayvon-martin/.

8

Krissah Thompson & Scott Wilson, Obama on Trayvon Martin: “If I Had
a Son, He’d Look like Trayvon,” Wash. Post (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-if-i-had-a-son-hed-look-like
-trayvon/2012/03/23/gIQApKPpVS_story.html.

9

Stephen Hudak & Jon Busdeker, Trayvon Martin Vigils: “We are All
About Peaceful Nonviolence,” Orlando Sentinel (Mar. 25, 2012), http://
articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-25/news/os-trayvon-martin-candlelight-vigil-20120325_1_candlelight-vigil-gated-community-skittles.
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Justice for Trayvon, http://www.justicefortrayvon.net/index.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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Deepti Hajela, Trayvon Martin “Million Hoodie March” Draws Hundreds in New York City, Huffington Post, (Mar. 21, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/21/trayvon-martin-million-hoodiemarch_n_1371403.html.
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privileged position as the basis for the enjoyment of all other rights.13
The implications for a high-publicity criminal trial are obvious: conflict between free press and the privacy of the accused is inevitable.
However, the role of the press is sovereign and must not be abridged
if the very fabric of freedom is to withstand. No matter how ineptly
a journalist may cover a criminal trial, their responsibility to safeguard the rights of a defendant very often stifle cries that they’re
abusing their margin of error (unless their obvious dishonesty indicts them). As evidenced by Mr. Burnside’s swift dismissal from
NBC, newscasters are not exactly running riot across the television
and computer screens of America. Yet, it must be wondered whether
Burnside’s swift removal is sufficient damage control in the age of
sharing and resharing. The news media in an environment of social
media is no longer the vessel of public information so much as a
springboard for debatable topics.
While incontrovertible First Amendment is crucial in forestalling abuses of power on all sides, the media of today is not the media
of 1787. The media today exerts a powerful influence beyond that of
guardian of good conduct—that role, in fact, has been overwhelmed
by those of demagogue, dramatist, and divider. Rather, the autonomy
of the press coupled with its pervasiveness allows it to mobilize more
people more quickly than ever before. This is, of course, old hat given the namesake of the Pulitzer Prize; but the overblown effects are
not. The advent of the internet and the “Me Generation” (thanks to
which a good number of people hear about major news stories from
self-declared pundits on Facebook and/or other social media sites before they hear it from the source), it is not uncommon to be familiar
with public opinion of a person or event without any acquaintance
with the reasons for it. Many in the Twitterverse heard that Zimmerman was a racist before they heard he’d shot Trayvon Martin. Many
still don’t know that Zimmerman’s neighborhood was experiencing
robberies pell-mell at the time Martin was shot.
While the charge of racism broke no laws, the spirit of the Due
Process clause came into question. The court found in Estes v. Texas

13

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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that “the most fundamental of all freedoms”14 is the right to be tried
fairly for those crimes of which we are accused. The right to be justly
dealt with in a court of law “must be maintained at all costs”15 as
tantamount to the very right to freedom. This freedom cannot be
seized by the whims of either an individual accuser or by an unruly
mob. All other rights are accessories to the right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness and are rendered useless without that autonomy which facilitates their enjoyment. No action, no policy, no
person that denies a person the right to fair treatment can have place
in a civilized nation, not even when that detriment poses as righteous legality (or when it is technically sanctioned by law). In fact, a
primary reason why freedom of speech and the press is considered
sacrosanct is that it holds officials accountable for their treatment of
the citizenry, including those accused of a crime. The moment press
runs amok and jeopardizes the rights of the accused, it defies its own
effectiveness as a safeguard of liberty.
This “most fundamental of all freedoms” faces a growing threat
in not only the volume of influence occupied by mass media, but in
the multitude of directions in which it exerts itself. “Trial by media”
is hardly a novel concern; but the media is a force to be reckoned
with in ways that defy the old doctrines as the potential audience
for speech broadens and the potential power of its mouthpieces, as
a consequence, expands. While the First Amendment has always
clashed with others, the principles that once delineated the bounds
of freedom of expression with reasonable clarity and somewhat predictable results are now stretched by its ubiquity. How, then, can one
mitigate the effects of the ubiquitous media as justice so demands
when its actions are governed by an obsolete set of standards that
directly contradicts the demands of due process under novel circumstances? How can we accommodate the rights of the accused when
the media wields such power without violating the letter of the law?

14

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).

15

Id.
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II. Pretrial Publicity and the Zimmerman Trial
The Zimmerman debacle is a worst-case scenario of what happens when a mistake made by the news media takes control of the
entire story: Before the trial has even begun, Zimmerman faces
threats on his very life.16 He has become familiar with the sting that
accompanies bereavement of one’s good standing in the community
(and a very large community, in this case). In addition to the natural
anguish a human being must experience after precipitating the death
of another,17 Zimmerman has a price on his head;18 and he and his
attorneys are receiving menacing messages en masse from anonymous sources, as well as being threatened on open online forums.
Says Zimmerman’s friend, Joe Oliver: “George has virtually lost his
life, too.”19

16

Chris Francescani, “Trayvon Martin Shooter’s Friend: George
Zimmerman has ‘Virtually Lost His Life, Too’, ABC News (Mar. 27,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-shooters-friend-georgezimmerman-virtually-lost/story?id=16001811.
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Chris Francescani, Trayvon Martin Shooter “Couldn’t Stop Crying” After
Shooting. ABC News (Mar.25, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvonmartin-shooter-couldnt-stop-crying-shooting/story?id=15997075.
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Who are They? Christian Science Monitor, (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0327/New-Black-Panthers-offer-reward-forGeorge-Zimmerman.-Who-are-they.
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The criticisms of his neighbors,20 coworkers,21 and former fiancée have been disseminated among innumerable strangers whose
reception of the charges against him is untempered by any personal
acquaintance. Again, this problem has haunted high-profile criminal trials for decades. What differentiates Zimmerman’s case from
others is the degree to which outright falsehood is to blame for public perception of him. In most cases, the so-called perpetrator of a
crime is usually portrayed unflatteringly for a lack of other immediately available information (or a sufficient counterbalance), whereas
the absence of symmetry in the way Zimmerman is viewed can be
traced to a primordial misrepresentation of his motives.
It doesn’t help in the least that this flaw has been replicated until
the coding of the case as it has been presented to the public bears no
resemblance to its original form. A stunning manifestation of the
sort of journalistic sloth that jeopardizes the efficacy of the courtroom is seen in starkest clarity in an episode of Real Time wherein
Bill Maher makes a case for Zimmerman’s dishonesty under the
guise of exploring the possibilities. After airing the footage of Zimmerman’s arrival at the police station just after shooting Martin, Maher begins his suggestive build-up: “If you had a broken nose, your
shirt would be filled with blood.” (There is no blood, either on Zimmerman’s face or on his shirt, in the footage shown.) “This is Mr.
Zimmerman coming into the police station AFTER he said that his
nose was broken, he had this big fight with this kid…I’m going to ask
22
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Aggressive Tactics Before Trayvon Martin Killing, Huffington Post,
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/12/georgezimmerman-trayvon-martin_n_1340358.html.
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a very basic question.” After painting himself as a hitherto impartial
spectator, Maher ends on a crescendo: “Aren’t we all convinced from
that tape that this guy is a big, fat, f***ing liar?”23 His guests and
audience meet his smashing climax with laughter (apparently neither
realizing that a broken nose need not necessarily be bloody24 nor
imagining that Zimmerman may have cleaned himself up before being questioned), and a superficial analysis of the situation is treated
as a commonsense observation: If it makes sense to Bill Maher that
a broken nose entails blood, than no evidence to the contrary is to
be taken seriously. The consequences that follow when an inexpert
assessment is presented as authoritative can only grow in magnitude
with media pervasiveness.
The broadcast of the faulty recording was a mistake. Its perpetuation under such flimsy premises could not be mistaken for objectivity, and the fact that Maher broadcasted the doctored recording as
opinion does not exempt him from from defamation. A cynic might
even characterize the media coverage in this case as a means for
partisans to exact larger social justice in the event that the courts
disagree with their assessment of Zimmerman. What is clear is that,
whether or not Zimmerman is guilty of second-degree murder or
even a hate crime, his opponents are building their claims on a foundation that is, as yet, unsteady.
The verdict in any trial will ideally be arrived at “only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence
[in the form of] public print.”25 However, widespread attention to
a case is, as yet, little understood even by psychologists, let alone
those responsible for conducting voir dire (the process by which bi-

23
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Gun Laws, Huffington Post, (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.
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ased jurors are filtered out).26 If court proceedings could be skewed
in the way that public opinion is swayed, it is probably not to the
side of justice. Although provisions are made for the defendants of
propagandized trials, their effectiveness has been a matter of debate
for decades because there is no clear-cut standard for evaluating the
effects of media coverage. It is very difficult to prove a link between
even a clear presumption of prejudice and a prejudiced jury because
of the traditional faith the justice system invests in the jury selection process and their consequent conviction that voire dire should
be sufficient to ensure adequate fairness.27 Subjective criteria like
the passage of time28 and the nature of a crime29 have been used to
determine whether or not impartiality is even a likely possibility and
dismissed on the assumption that jurors will react in a certain way
to certain types of evidence. Furthermore, those means which must
be exhausted before an appeal on that order can be made depend
heavily on the honesty and personal insight of potential jurors during
an inquisition into their neutrality.30 While media frenzy may have
an effect upon a juror that the jurors, themselves do not gauge, the
methods at hand do not address this problem.
Past defendants have, of course, been able to prove that they
were not given a fair trial; but only when the cause for concern is
as clear and exaggerated as when ⅔ of the jury confess to a belief
in the guilt of the accused from the start,31 the trial was almost literally transformed into a press conference,32 33 or a film of the de-
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fendant’s confession was released.34 There is not much that can be
done about jurors who place too much faith in their own fairness or
who are outright lying in the hope of seeing justice as they know it
done regardless of what they might be shown to the contrary. In a
case so racially and politically charged as Zimmerman’s, it requires
little imagination suppose that some would see their selection to the
jury as a mandate to convict. There is some evidence to suggest that
even individuals who have formed an opinion about a case can be
swayed by what they are shown in court;35 but what effect can this
have when the question to be resolved in trial has, in the mind of the
community, become one of validating the evil of hate crimes, and
not of deciding whether Zimmerman is, in fact, guilty of one? The
power of the news media as it now exists is historically unparalleled.
Is traditional voir dire equipped to handle an increasingly saturated
jury pool?

III. A Dangerous New Precedent?
One need not even be selected to serve on a jury to turn the
tide of justice, anymore—that Zimmerman faces charges at all is
largely due to the 2 million signatures Martin’s parents gathered on
the Change.org petition and presented to the Attorney General of
Florida. It might be a little premature to say, at this point, that the
influence of this online petition could extend to the outcome of any
future trial in this particular instance. It is not, however, out of line
to say that it could. Indeed, it would hardly be the first time that external forces have influenced court proceedings.
Take, for example, this case: during the summer of 2011, 16-yearold Savannah Dietrich passed out while drinking at a party. While
unconscious, she was sexually assaulted and photographed. The pictures bearing record of her rape were distributed at her high school,
and Dietrich brought her attackers to court. Following the trial, the
students responsible were given a plea bargain, and she was placed
under a gag rule and threatened with 180 days in jail if she named the
34
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35
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boys who assaulted her. Enraged, Dietrich published their names on
her Twitter account, declaring that it was her civic duty to warn others. On July 23, 2012, a Change.org petition was created to persuade
the authorities to drop the charges against her. A week and more than
100,000 signatures later, the charges were dropped. Reads the triumphant Change.org email: “One lawyer even told reporters that all
the attention from Savannah’s supporters on the internet made filing
the charges just not worth it—no wonder, when the petition received
attention from MSNBC and the Associated Press, to name a few.”
What does the legal victory-by-viral have to do with George
Zimmerman? Simply, it illustrates one unequivocal, highly consequential fact: that in an age of social media and involvement, pretrial
publicity has more power than ever.

IV. Legal Safeguards Against Excessive Pretrial Publicity
This power threatens the presumption of innocence that, since
long before the founding of the nation, has been the bedrock of America’s rights-driven legal system. This principle has been staunchly
upheld in courtrooms throughout the country from the Constitution’s birth. Although the 6th and 14th Amendments guarantee the
individual accused of a crime a “speedy and public trial” and “due
process of law,” there are forces at work outside the legal system
that increasingly threaten to frustrate the goals of justice. These
forces can no longer be sheltered beneath the umbrella of the First
Amendment as competing interests; in a time when the power of
an omnipresent press reaches such heights and takes such a variety
of forms, it is crucial that its role in a legally egalitarian society be
reexamined. When the freedoms guaranteed by a First Amendment
supersede the interests protected by other laws, they defeat their own
purpose. To quote Judith Lichtenberg, “Unlike freedom of speech,
to certain aspects of which our commitment must be virtually unconditional, freedom of the press should be contingent on the degree to which it promotes certain values at the core of our interest in
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freedom of expression generally.”36 While freedom of speech is the
inherent right of a being to express and question opinions, the news
media are bound to dispassionately report matters of public concern.
The freedom of the press promotes a free nation if it fulfills its duty
to liberate fact from rumor, not when it uses its power to overwhelm
fact with hearsay or to quash truths it perceives as unacceptable.
Zimmerman is receiving the public trial promised by the Sixth
Amendment, but benefits from that fact as much as if he were being
tried in secret. What makes this problem so incredibly pernicious
is the fact that justice, in this instance, is under attack by her own
devices. The safeguards—public trials by jury, free press, due process—that have been so meticulously positioned to forestall miscarriage of justice have divided against themselves to jeopardize the
liberties they were originally put in place to protect. “Such examples,” continues Lichtenberg, “look from the outside like a betrayal
by the media of the First Amendment’s purpose, as lives and liberties are destroyed in pursuit of stories that sell.”37
This is not to say that the First Amendment and its proponents
act as a blight upon fair trials. For instance, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process as mentioned in the Sixth Amendment relies heavily upon the exercise of freedoms ensured by the
First Amendment for its potency. Without media coverage of criminal trials, there is nothing to preserve a trial’s fairness except for the
consciences of judge and jury. The Framers never intended for the
defendant in a criminal trial to have total privacy; only that their guilt
would not be falsely established sub rosa. The publicity surrounding
criminal trials, therefore, is not only not inherently defamatory, but
desirable for the ultimate protection of the defendant.
However, the free speech mechanism is, today, far more powerful
than the Framers could have envisioned: all news, once published, is
fair game for social media sites, blogs, snarky television personali36
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ties, etc. All news, factual or corrupt, is easily accessible to almost
all citizens the moment it sees the light of day. On the other hand, all
news is not created equal: Many people do not continue to follow a
story to its conclusion after the initial headline, assuming their first
exposure to a story was not from a tertiary source (Twitter posting,
Facebook status, or other probably partial commentator). Before a
retraction of a faulty report can be issued, the original report has already circulated to more people than the retraction is likely to reach;
and the primacy effect dictates that the first impression of a case will
be the one that sticks, even without regard to the explosion of reactions to the first news drowning it out. To some extent, this cannot
be avoided. The exercise of a free press requires that some leeway be
granted to its agents. On the other hand, journalists should be mindful of the unprecedented power of their words and hesitate before
making a statement that could destroy someone’s post-trial life (or
end it pre-trial). Unfortunately, this is not what a journalist is paid to
do. The material demands of the journalist must, therefore, be reconciled somehow with the demands of the public for accuracy.

V. The Necessity of Incentivizing Truth
Because the influence of the media is greater now than it has
ever been, greater care should be taken to see that reputations are
not needlessly endangered. Anti-defamation statutes exist for this
purpose, but they cannot prevent the permanent damage that results
when sloppy journalism brands someone a racist murderer. What’s
more, journalistic wiggle room has historically made defamation
lawsuits extremely difficult. It seems, therefore, that accuracy cannot be legally enforced.
The post facto remedy of a defamation lawsuit, even if it should
succeed, is a consolation prize at best to people like Zimmerman
whose lives have been irreparably overturned. Ideally, such travesties would be altogether preventable. However, the only alternative
is to directly influence the media, itself by incentivizing accuracy.
How, though, does a hard-power entity like the law go about
making changes in an independent force like the news media without either arrogating too much power for itself or limiting the pow-
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er of the press in a way the Constitution does not (and should not)
currently allow? Preferably, the strategic application of soft power
would serve to incentivize meticulous reporting to bring into harmony the lofty aim of informing the citizenry and the material goal
of making a profit. How, though, does the federal government apply
soft power as a hard-power institution? How, too, could it use that
soft power to incentivize accuracy?

VI. The Machinery at Work
The ideal role of a news source under a representative government and the actions that promote the continued operation of a given
news source are twain. The reliability of a news source is not what
determines how many papers it will sell, how many viewers will
tune in, or how much traffic its web site will attract. In addition to
being bound to a certain code of conduct, newspeople are beholden
to citizens for their existence and must, therefore, cater to the tastes
of the same by reporting news that is relevant to their lives and/or generically interesting. The press cannot force-feed the public on civic
involvement if what the public really wants is lurid crimes and the
Kardashians; and there is no provision allowing any higher power to
prescribe what sort of information should be run. Currently, public
approval dangles a much larger carrot over the press than does duty
to a state that does not and cannot exercise more than the barest
control over it.
One promising solution would be the establishment of an independent media watchdog agency be established to evaluate the reportage of the most prominent news items and to issue reports to the
American public on the quality of information they are receiving
from their choice of news source. These reports would be based on
published criteria to prevent corrupt dealings on the part of the committee, itself and to allow the public to judge the committee by those
same criteria.
Media watchdog groups are old hat by now, but almost all of
them are politically affiliated. News Busters and Media Research
Center exist solely to point out bias in the liberal media; Media Matters bats for the Left. These groups are, predictably, widely dismissed
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as fringe groups and are not given a great deal of credibility. A politically unaffiliated group with straightforward judging criteria—criteria which could be used to evaluate their own performance—could
solve this. The publication of report cards on the public’s sources of
information would rechannel energies of public discourse into an examination of those same media sources, as well as the source of their
examination. Free speech needs to be heightened, not curtailed if the
problem of inaccurate reportage is to be solved without compromising the First Amendment.
The direct application of pressure from, say, law enforcement is
likely to invite backlash and little else. However, an official media
watchdog agency with authority to issue reports, but not to enforce
ethical conduct would conceivably induce newsmen to reconsider
their course by affecting public approval of that news agency. The
government would have no hand in the watchdog’s operation, but
would, by establishing it, be fulfilling its end to promote accuracy
in the media.
Any remedy for the status quo would necessarily have to be indirect without being underhanded. The current system is not corrupt,
but out of balance; news sources are beholden to the dollar more
than they are to promoting an informed populace that wants to be
entertained as much as it wants honesty. In order to incentivize the
accurate news reporting that will cast a spotlight on the government
that is under scrutiny, one must put power [knowledge] in the hands
of the citizenry to regulate the press with or without minimal aid
from the very same government. For this to work, the citizenry must
have a reason to police its own news sources. Making things easy, it
seems the people already have one: For all the misinformation that is
inevitably abroad in the land, the populace at least knows that there
are flies in the soup it’s being fed. According to a Gallup poll taken
in September 2011, only 44% of Americans have fair to great trust
in the mainstream news media, while 55% have serious misgivings,
which seems to indicate that Americans will take the initiative to
scrutinize the news media.
The public wants more than a horoscope and a crossword puzzle,
but it is important to make sure that the right powers are ensuring
that. The citizens of the United States are limited in their power
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by the manner of information that they are fed by the news media.
However, their interests are better served by a free press than by an
endless stream of propaganda from an omnipotent Big Brother. Although citizens carry a tremendous amount of power, their application is limited by its indirectness.
The interaction of the powers of government, news media, and
citizenry can be illustrated as a triad in which the three parties most
involved in criminal justice exert forces upon one another. As this
model indicates, each party is pressured and can apply pressure to
the others, but there is nothing to moderate their interaction or to
promote equilibrium among them. Currently, there is little to check
the behavior/motivate strictly factual reporting by those in the news
media except for the collective American wallet; the government has
almost no power to influence the actions of the press (even where
warranted). The power of public approval over the workings of government is mediated by the news media. Presumably, the aforementioned media watchdog agency could serve the purpose of promoting
fair play among the warring powers and competing interests by directly incentivizing those actions which will indirectly lead to the
equilibrium that benefits all involved.

VII. Conclusion
Thus, the very devices that threaten a fair trial can be used to
check the motions of the news media and, indirectly, that same consuming populace. There is no better time to put such a plan into
action, now that the country at large is disillusioned with the media,
poised for reform, and receptive to change. The First Amendment is
not compromised by such a course; the demands of the Due Process
Clause are satisfied; and the system of checks and balances on which
the nation operates is revitalized to a more constructive end. Corruption cannot, of course, be prevented with absolute certainty, but
the not quite peripheral outcome of creating a culture of scrutiny by
the citizens would give more power to the same to choose their own
medicine. If government must operate as a large, impersonal machine, human watchfulness is required to supervise that operation.

The Fundamental Flaw of Eminent Domain
Jurisprudence
Neal Hoopes1

I

magine that you live on a small family farm in rural America, a
farm that has belonged to your family for generations, each successive generation carving out a living through hard labor and
determination. Now, imagine that the state legislature has just authorized a large factory to take your land and convert it into something
the state legislature deems more economically beneficial to the state
and to “society.” Without your consent the government condemns
your property, pays you the minimum market value per acre, and
forces you to uproot your family and change your profession. You
seek legal counsel, but your attorney informs you that the case has
almost no chance of being successful because according to current
constitutional interpretation the legislature need only provide a rational justification for the taking; the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the act rests entirely on you. Most Americans would
probably say that this hypothetical situation is impossible, even unAmerican. Yet, the courts have recently undermined property rights
to the level that makes this situation very plausible, making Kelo
v. City of New London one of the most controversial U.S. Supreme
Court cases in the modern era.2
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held that economic growth
and benefit are within the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amend1

Neal Hoopes is a senior in political science at Brigham Young University.
He gives special thanks to Kris Tina Carlston, Brian Reed, Brooke Smith,
Brandon Roberts, David Crockett, Brooke Miller, and Rob Allen for their
helpful suggestions and significant contributions to this paper.

2

Ilya Somin, What if Kelo v. City of New London Had Gone the Other
Way? 45 Ind. L. Rev. 21 (2011).
99

100

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 27, 2013

ment and that the government could take private property by eminent domain and give it to another private entity, so long as the result
would be more economically beneficial to the public.3 Kelo, along
with other similar Supreme Court cases, has left private property
with little protection from government takings and the caprice of the
legislative branch. These cases have already been decided, and it is
unlikely that the Court will change its views on property entirely;
however, it may be possible to reach a compromise as to the status
of private property rights before the Court is tempted to include additional categories into the already overbroad Public Use Clause. I
argue that the text of the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments designates
private property rights as fundamental; therefore, the courts should
adjudicate cases involving eminent domain by applying an altered
form of strict scrutiny. This article seeks to delineate the difference
between economic rights, which receive very little judicial protection, and fundamental rights, which receive the strictest protection.
By seeking to understand why the U.S. Supreme Court has designed
property rights as economic rights, this article reaches a conclusion
as to how private property rights can be protected while continuing
to ensure that government interests will not be too severely limited. I
argue that in cases involving eminent domain the government ought
to prove a compelling state interest as well as a narrowly tailored
purpose. However, to ensure that the government may use eminent
domain when necessary without needing to prove that the state used
the least restrictive means possible, I argue that the state need not
fulfill the third prong of strict scrutiny.
The U.S. Supreme Court guarantees differing levels of protection to fundamental rights versus economic rights, making it necessary to understand the difference before fully appreciating the need
to designate the ownership of private property as fundamental. An
economic right is quite distinct from a fundamental right, and they
are founded on differing principles. A fundamental right is one that
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is based on “divine law, natural law, or a similar source.”4 They are
rights that society considers to be self-evident, as expressed so poetically in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Continuing on, Thomas
Jefferson declared that “to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed”—in other words, the primary purpose of governments
is to protect fundamental rights from being usurped by unjust men.
The U.S. Supreme Court has designated a fundamental right as a
privilege akin to the right to life (e.g. civil rights or the right to marriage5) which cannot be taken away unless a person willingly forfeits
that right.6 An economic right, however, is considered a “positive
right,” one that the legislative or executive branch fabricates to fulfill
a specific, persuasive purpose (e.g. the right to social security or a
minimum standard of living). Legislatures can give, take, or change
positive rights based on whether the perception surrounding the validity of these rights remains the same.7
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I. History
The U.S. Supreme Court has long considered economic rights to
be “non-fundamental,” but this has not always been true. Until 1937,
economic rights, and more particularly the “right to contract,” were
considered fundamental rights. The most famous case involving the
right of contract is Lochner v. New York, wherein the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional a New York statute attempting to
regulate bakeries.8 In 1895, the state passed a law limiting the number of hours that a baker could work to ten per day and sixty per
week. The Court rejected the argument that the law was needed to
protect the safety of the bakers and ruled that the law was “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and
liberty of the individual to contract.” Lochner was the first case to
protect the economic “right to contract” (designating it as a fundamental right) and it would certainly not be the last.
During a time which scholars would later term the Lochner era,
the court protected economic rights in cases as diverse as Hammer
v. Dagenhart,9 striking down federal legislation on child labor, and
Carter v. Carter Coal Company,10 invalidating federal legislation
regulating the coal industry. In 1937, the Court suddenly cut short
the trend of invalidating economic regulation. Under pressure from
President Roosevelt, the Supreme Court upheld a federal minimum
wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,11 and the Lochner
era became part of legal history, but no longer part of valid legal
precedent. Since the end of the Lochner era, the Supreme Court has
largely refrained from striking down legislation aimed at regulating
economic activities and given legislatures wide deference regarding
economic regulation and the extent to which they protect economic
rights. The Court went from one extreme to another, from striking
down all legislation that infringed on the right of contract to consoli8
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dating all economic rights into one category and stripping them of
judicial protection.
Following West Coast Hotel and the Court’s sudden swing to
legislative deference, the issue of whether property rights would be
designated as an economic or fundamental right remained open for
almost two decades. However, in 1954 the Supreme Court addressed
the eminent domain question in Berman v. Parker and ruled that
property was an economic right.12 In Berman, a department store
which was situated in a heavily blighted area of southwest Washington D.C. was to be taken by eminent domain as part of the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. Samuel Berman contended
that the taking violated the Fifth Amendment and could not be considered an act of “public use.” In a unanimous vote, the Supreme
Court held that the purpose of beautifying the city was within the
authority of the government, and it therefore possessed the Constitutional right to seize Berman’s property by eminent domain. Justice
Douglas declared in his opinion that “once the question of the public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be
taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”13
Following this ruling, “public use” began to be widely interpreted
as “public purpose,” meaning that the taking does not need to be for
public use, but the project need only have a rational purpose that indirectly benefits the public. Justice Thomas explained the shift when
he wrote, “This deferential shift in phraseology enables the Court to
hold, against all common sense, that a costly urban-renewal project
whose stated purpose is a vague promise of new jobs and increased
tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer
Corporation, is for a ‘public use’” (emphasis added).14 The legislature no longer had to prove a public purpose but a vague purpose or
expectation of public benefit.
Thirty years later, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff deepened
the Court’s resolve to consider all private property cases as it does
12
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cases involving economic regulation.15 In the mid-1960s, the Hawaii
Legislature found that the State and Federal Governments owned
nearly 49% of Hawaiian land, and seventy-two private landowners
owned another 47%. In an attempt to supply an overall “economic
benefit” to the broader population, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that Hawaii could carry out its land reform by redistributing the
land by use of eminent domain. The decision held that the redistribution’s purpose was to fix concentrated property ownership and was
therefore a justifiable “public use.”
The latest broadening of the Public Use Clause occurred with
the 2005 decision by the Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London. In the late 1990s, the city of New London, Connecticut, was
experiencing an economic downturn; its unemployment rate was almost double that of the state, and its population was moving, resulting in the city’s population dropping to the lowest levels since the
1920s. In 2000, the city approved a plan that promised to “create in
excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and . . . to
revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown
and waterfront areas.”16 The city’s development agent purchased
property from all the willing sellers in the area and attempted to use
the power of eminent domain to acquire the requisite land from the
remaining property owners that did not wish to sell. The issue that
eventually went before the U.S. Supreme Court was not whether the
state has the power to condemn property but whether the transfer of
private property to another private entity constituted a “public use.”
As Justice Stevens wrote in the majority opinion, “it has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the
sole purpose of transferring it to private party B, even though A is
paid just compensation.”17 Yet, contrary to legal tradition, the Court
ultimately decided that the government can take property of A and
give it to another private party B as long as the receiving party is

15

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).

16

Kelo v. City of New London, 268 Conn. 1, 5, 843 A. 2d 500, 507 (2004).

17

Kelo. 545 U.S. at 473.

The Fundamental Flaw of Eminent Domain Jurisprudence

105

part of a “carefully considered development plan” that could benefit
the public. 18
With Kelo v. City of New London, private property rights were
significantly compromised because the Court ruled, essentially, that
not only were property rights considered economic, or non-fundamental rights, but also that these lesser, economic rights could be
superseded by a general “economic benefit” to the general public.19

II. Economic Rights and Rational Basis Standard
Judges treat the ownership of private property rights as an economic right because they see the primary value that people receive
from owning property as being economic or monetary. In regulatory
takings cases, which deprive people of the use of their property because of government regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court has usually
formed its decisions around an economic argument—yet the Court
has used a similar reasoning in eminent domain cases. In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court ruled that Lucas’ right
to his property was driven by his economic interests and the state
had deprived him of those interests.20 Lucas wanted to build a house
on his South Carolina beach-front property but could not because of
laws attempting to combat erosion and to preserve resources. The
Supreme Court ruled that the state had deprived Lucas’ property of
all economic value and, therefore, Lucas was due “just compensation” by the state. Since the arguments surrounding regulatory takings revolve around the loss of economic benefit to the owner, the
Supreme Court justifies its rulings in eminent domain cases based
upon purely economic factors.
The most common concern that scholars and judges raise regarding private property rights being considered fundamental is that
it would severely limit the government’s ability to take property for
legitimate projects that have historically been included in the Fifth
Amendment’s limit of “public use.” This view was best explained
18
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by Justice Anthony Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Kelo: “A
broad per se rule or a strong presumption of invalidity [using a higher standard of scrutiny], furthermore, would prohibit a large number
of government takings that have the purpose and expected effect of
conferring substantial benefits on the public at large and so do not offend the Public Use Clause.”21 Kennedy objected to the raising of the
standard because by designating private property as a fundamental
right, the government would be placed under such a stringent judicial standard that projects such the building of roads and hospitals
would become almost impossible since few takings would pass the
strict scrutiny test and be considered constitutional. This concern
is legitimate, especially if the Court were to use the three pronged
strict scrutiny test that normally applies to cases involving fundamental rights. Yet, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prove that
private property ought to be considered fundamental even if it requires the Court to invalidate some projects that the public would
deem beneficial. Property rights are vital and deeply imbedded in
the American tradition. But there are ways in which the Court may
alter the judicial standard that would resolve many of the critiques of
property rights being fundamental.

III. Eminent Domain
Before making the case for property rights being considered
fundamental, it is important to analyze the actual text of the Fifth
Amendment. The Amendment states: “No person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just

21
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compensation.”22 It is important to note that the Constitution, via the
Fifth Amendment, specifically gives the government the power of
eminent domain, or the authority to take property without the owner’s consent. Eminent domain is an authorized, legitimate exercise
of the government’s power—when used appropriately as designated
by the Bill of Rights. Not only is eminent domain included in the
Constitution, but the principle extends back to English common law.
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines the term as being:
The power of a nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned upon the payment of a
just compensation. . . . The theory of such power, otherwise
known as compulsory purchase or expropriation, is that all
lands are held mediately or immediately from the state, upon
the implied condition that the eminent domain, the superior
dominion, remains in the state, authorizing it to take the
same for public uses, when necessity requires it, by paying
therefore an equivalent in money. It resembles the ancient
prerogative of purveyance whereby the crown enjoyed the
right of buying up provisions and other necessities for the
use of the royal household at an appraised valuation and
in preference to all others, even without the consent of the
owner.23
It is clear that English common law, after which the American legal
system is patterned, designed that the state was the ultimate holder
of property and that the government could take property for certain
22
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purposes. This argument is used by scholars and judges to justify
the usage and recent expansion of the concept of eminent domain.24
They argue that eminent domain is a fundamental government right
and must be balanced by the right of private property. Specifically
because of this long-held common law tradition, I argue that the
Founders saw it necessary to include a limiting clause on the government’s authority regarding takings and to limit it to only takings
involving “public use.” The Articles of the U.S. Constitution grant
the government its authority to administer, and the Bill of Rights
was written and ratified to place specific limits on the government’s
power and control in order to protect the people.

IV. American Founders
At the heart of the eminent domain debate is the Fifth Amendment. In addition to eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment places
limits on the government’s ability to hold criminals, prosecute criminals twice for the same crime, or compel people to witness against
themselves. It could be argued that the Fifth Amendment lumps several disjointed rights into one amendment; but even though the rights
enumerated are not tightly connected, all rights are given to the individual and are designed specifically to limit the government’s power
in certain spheres. The Fifth Amendment does not only grant the
government the power of eminent domain, but limits it to cases in
which the taking would be for “public use” and prohibits takings
without compensation.
It is also clear that property and property rights were fundamental to the idea of the American system as framed by the Founders.
In fact, “life, liberty and property” are mentioned together—putting
them on equal footing before the law. To the Founders, property was
not any less important before the law than was life or liberty. Professors Lee and Hipp report that “Madison’s minutes of the Constitutional Convention reveal that . . . at least four members, without any
opposition, proclaim[ed] that the ‘great object’ of government is to
24
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protect property. Historians of the colonial period generally agree
that the Revolution was fought to foster and preserve property.”25 Unfortunately, the long history of the courts does not reflect this view.
Case by case, decade after decade, the Supreme Court has whittled
away property rights until they bear little resemblance to those envisioned by the Founders. If John Adams could see the degeneration of property rights that has occurred in American jurisprudence
he would likely lament, as he did in his lifetime, “After a generous
contest for liberty, of twenty years’ continuance, Americans forgot
wherein liberty consisted. After a bloody war in defense of property,
they forgot that property was sacred.”26 Regrettably, the attack on
property rights that President Adams witnessed in his lifetime pales
in comparison to the almost complete disregard for economic rights
that the Supreme Court now holds.
Shortly after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Justice Chase penned
this thoughtful observation:
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
. . . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. . . . [A]
law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against
all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature
with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed
that they have done it (emphasis deleted). 27
Kelo v. City of New London did exactly what Justice Chase thought
so inconceivable in 1789—it took property from A and gave it to B,
entrusting to the legislature all power to decide whether such a taking is constitutional and fulfills the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. In her scathing dissent (joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
25
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and Justices Scalia and Thomas), Justice O’Connor elucidated the
consequences of the court’s decision in Kelo v. New London:
Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation
on government power. Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being
taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it
might be upgraded—.i.e., given to an owner who will use
it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the
public—in the process. To reason, as the Court does, that
the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent
ordinary use of private property render economic development takings “for public use” is to wash out any distinction
between private and public use of property—and thereby effectively to delete the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.28
Justice O’Connor lamented that this case would become legal precedent because she understood how it stripped property rights of a
long-held protection and removed from property one of its last protections from government exploitation.
The legitimate use of eminent domain is not at issue—even the
Founders knew the government must have some recourse in order
to accomplish needed improvements and infrastructural projects.
What is at issue is the judicial standard by which cases regarding
eminent domain are decided. Property rights are fundamental rights
and ought to be afforded stronger protections by the judicial branch.
Property rights are fundamental by definition. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a civil liberty as “freedom from undue governmental
interference or restraint”29 and defines civil rights as “the individual
rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”30 Thus,
fundamental rights are those guaranteed to the people by the Bill
of Rights. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its definition of fundamental rights and has decided
28
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that some rights are less fundamental, and therefore less protected,
than other rights. Beginning with West Coast Hotel Co.,31 the Supreme Court refrained from striking down legislation which aimed
at regulating businesses and protected people’s liberty in their economic endeavors. Instead of adjudicating according to strict scrutiny
on cases of business regulation, in Carolene Products the standard
became the rational basis test and the Court stated that “legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless, in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.”32 Carolene Products has long been
cited when discussing cases involving economic benefit because it
set the precedent for giving wide deference to legislatures in deciding the constitutionality of their laws regarding business regulation.
This precedent along with others such as West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish are now so deeply embedded in the judicial system that it
would be injudicious to consider going back to the Lochner era in
which the right to contract was considered a fundamental right. Unfortunately, these precedents have been unwisely extended to all
cases involving economic benefit, including property rights, against
what I argue was the intent of Carolene Products. Justice Stone specifically limited the ruling to cases involving “ordinary commercial
transactions.” The now famous footnote four also gives us needed
guidance as to when to use a narrower standard: “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth.”33
As set forth by Justice Powell in footnote four, property rights
should be protected by a stronger judicial standard. Property rights
31
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are mentioned twice in the Fifth Amendment and protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.34 Also, eminent domain does not fall into the category of ordinary commercial transactions; no one who has had his or her property condemned would
consider the government’s taking of property as any form of ordinary transaction. Therefore, the use of Justice Stone’s opinion as
precedent in property cases does not apply and does not restrict eminent domain cases from being judged using a higher level of judicial
scrutiny.
Adjudicating using rational basis scrutiny removes a key government limitation and lays open the potential for the exploitation of
property owners. As Justice O’Connor aptly illustrated in her dissent
in Kelo, the decision essentially opened eminent domain to being
used as a tool for the majority to unjustly oppress the minority. With
economic benefit now being part of “public use,” everyone’s property is vulnerable to being taken for any purpose that the legislature
can plausibly rationalize could be put to better use and that could
positively affect the pocketbook of the majority. Homes, farms, and
small business are left with almost no recourse because any new
strip mall, housing complex, or movie theater could be considered
more economically beneficial to the majority.
Also, the Supreme Court has ruled that fundamental rights are
those that are “fundamental to the American scheme of justice” as
defined in Duncan v. Louisiana.35 Expropriating private property for
the benefit of the majority, while stripping the rights of the few, goes
against our sense of justice. As best expressed in Powell v. Alabama,
the exploitation of the few violates the “fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.” 36 Few things could be considered further from being
fundamental to America and all it stands for than the use of eminent
34

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
states, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

35

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).

36

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).

The Fundamental Flaw of Eminent Domain Jurisprudence

113

domain for the enrichment of private companies and the economic
benefit of the majority at the expense of property owners.

V. Strict Scrutiny
One of the reasons that the Supreme Court has been loath to recognize private property rights as fundamental is that cases involving
eminent domain would then be subject to strict scrutiny. In judicial
review, there are several standards by which the courts adjudicate.
Cases involving economic rights only have to pass the rational basis standard. In terms of eminent domain, the courts can only find
taking private property unconstitutional if there is absolutely no rational connection between the taking and the purpose for which the
private property was taken. In cases involving fundamental rights,
the government has first to prove that there is a compelling government interest. When speaking of compelling interest, it does not
simply mean that the interest or purpose is important; it means that
it satisfies a legal standard. Therefore, to have a constitutional taking
the government must not only explain why the taking is important
to the public, thus satisfying the “public use” clause, but it must also
describe why the taking “merits the designation of ‘compelling interest’ as a matter of law.”37 For example, in Berman v. Parker the
government took over a blighted area of Washington D.C. Not only
was the development program in D.C. important and compelling, but
it fulfilled a legal requirement in that the state had the authority to
take the property because of its constitutional “police powers.” D.C.
had a right to set regulations and take actions within their territory
for the betterment of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of
their inhabitants. Kelo v. City of New London would be much more
suspect because, even though the reason could be deemed important
or compelling, the taking was done for purely economic reasons and
not for reasons of health, safety, or morals (though one could make
an argument that it was done for the “general welfare”). Though
many takings cases could pass the “compelling interest” test, the
37
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state would have a larger burden of proving the importance of the
project and the legal standard it fulfills.
Second, in cases involving fundamental rights, the government
must prove that the action is narrowly tailored. When strict scrutiny
is applied, the government must prove the necessity of infringing on
a fundamental right.38 If the government action is too broad and does
not narrowly achieve its stated purpose then it would be considered
unconstitutional. For example, in Kelo v New London, the stated purpose of condemning the petitioners’ property was to develop part
of the city in order to jumpstart its flailing economy. To pass the
narrowly tailored part of the test the city would need to show that
there were not alternative means beyond condemning property that
would have achieved the same ends. In most traditional takings cases involving eminent domain this test will not be a strong inhibitor
of state action because in attempting to reduce traffic there are few
alternatives to building highways, and few alternatives to caring for
the sick than building hospitals.
The third prong of strict scrutiny is that the government must
prove it used the least restrictive means possible to accomplish its
purpose. I propose that private property rights be considered fundamental but that, due to the unique characteristics of eminent domain
cases, the government need not fulfill the “least restrictive means
possible” test in cases involving eminent domain. In fact, the Supreme Court often applies varying forms of strict scrutiny to tailor
the judgment to the circumstances.39 It is clear when reading Employment Division v. Smith40 involving the Free Exercise Clause,
Gratz v. Bollinger41 on affirmative action, and Burson v. Freeman42
about free speech that the Supreme Court applies the strict scrutiny
test differently when confronted with differing and unique issues.
38
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In excluding the third prong of the test, many of the concerns raised
by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Kelo are addressed.
Kennedy contended that a higher standard of scrutiny would prohibit
the state from taking part in projects that have real benefit to the
public and do not violate the Public Use Clause. If the taking fulfills
the compelling state interest and narrowly tailored prongs of strict
scrutiny, then the legislature would be given wide deference as to the
location and size of the project. The government would not be under
the obligation of proving that the result would be the least restrictive
means possible. In cases of roads and highways it would be appropriate to build larger and wider highways than needed to plan for future
expansion and growth without violating the Fifth Amendment.
By applying an altered form of strict scrutiny to cases involving eminent domain, property owners have more protection from
unconstitutional takings of their property and the government will
continue to be able to accomplish needed projects that do not offend the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In requiring the
government to prove its compelling interest and its efforts to fulfill
those interests by alternative means, strict scrutiny protects from unwarranted takings and requires accountability from the government.
Also, by not requiring that the government limit its projects to the
least restrictive means possible, legislatures across the country may
act to ensure the betterment and progress of society.

The Patriot Act & Constitutionality of
Electronic Surveillance
Michael Hayden1

T

he idea that government officials can listen to private conversations with impunity is unsettling at best. As new forms of
acquiring intelligence have come to light, more and more people have questioned the permissibility of such methods. Some congressmen as well as some security experts deplore the government’s
use of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, while
others consider it unfortunate, but necessary to effectively control
crime and gather intelligence.23 Although it may be an invasion of
privacy, electronic surveillance is both constitutional and necessary.
In an ideal world, a government would be able to ensure its citizens
an unqualified right to privacy, while still flawlessly providing for
their safety. However, in an ideal world there would be no terrorist
threats to the United States. Certainly the government should seek
for the ideal and strive to provide both liberty and security to its
people; unfortunately, neither can be provided unconditionally and
without regard to the other.
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Under ordinary circumstances, a person is entitled to the right
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. However, provisions exist,
even within the Fourth Amendment itself, which allow the government to circumvent certain civil liberties in order to protect the nation as a whole from danger. The Fourth Amendment states that a
person’s privacy may be invaded if it is not “unreasonable” and if
there is “probable cause”.4 To be candid, there are instances where
personal liberties must be abridged in order to ensure the security of
the United States. When the temporary abridgment of an individual’s
right to privacy may reasonably result in the preservation of innocent
American lives, the use of electronic surveillance is justified. In such
a circumstance, this action should not be deplored, because it is both
legal and necessary. An individual’s personal liberties cannot always
precede the safety of the community or nation as a whole. Many of
the current guidelines for electronic surveillance are found within
the USA PATRIOT ACT, commonly referred to as the Patriot Act.
Though some wrongfully question its constitutionality, it remains in
effect and clearly provides legal grounds for electronic surveillance.
The provisions in the Patriot Act that provide for the use of electronic surveillance are necessary in order to ensure national security
and should remain in force. Although controversies exist surrounding the Patriot’s infringement upon the rights of some to privacy,
this is in accordance with the Fourth Amendment, which stipulates
such limitation.5 The Patriot Act is constitutional. However, it is by
no means perfect, and if steps were taken to clarify its more vague
aspects, much of the existing controversy could be dispelled. In addition, if the executive branch was made more accountable for the
electronic surveillance that it conducts, few valid concerns would
remain. In some instances this would seem impractical, because
certain threats require decisive action and therefore, the executive
cannot always be held accountable prior to the use of electronic surveillance. However, a review committee should be put into place to
regularly review electronic surveillance performed by the executive
branch. In particular, the committee would review surveillance con4
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5
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ducted without a warrant. This would make the Executive accountable for all electronic surveillance that it conducts, without limiting
its ability to respond quickly to national security threats.

I. Origin, Historical Context, and Rationale for Electronic
Surveillance
As with any legal issue in the United States, the ultimate source
for determining the legality of electronic surveillance is the Constitution. The second article of the Fourth Amendment guarantees
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and against
warrants issued without “probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized”.6 Innovations in technology have
allowed for machines to invade the electronic possessions of others,
such as phone calls and e-mails, making the invasion of privacy a
serious concern.7 As a result, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to encompass the protection of all forms of privacy, especially
against government surveillance.8 Those who argue that wiretapping
violates the Fourth Amendment’s implied protection of privacy overlook the provision in the Fourth Amendment that allows this right to
be abridged if there is probable cause and proper documentation.9
In addition, Article Two of the Constitution states that the President is to be Commander in Chief, and as such, he must have certain
powers to fulfill this role.10 As the anonymous author of a note in
the Harvard Law Review expressed, “regardless of what the Fourth
Amendment may require, the Executive must be permitted the use
6
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of warrantless National Security electronic surveillance if he is to
fulfill his responsibilities as Commander in Chief.”11 Although the
use of such surveillance on citizens of the United States requires
careful regulation, wiretapping seems to be within the bounds of the
Constitution under certain circumstances. Where criminal acts and
security threats exist, electronic surveillance is permissible, but not
without limitation. With the exception of war or another imminent
national threat, wiretapping can be performed only after the executive has received a judicially issued warrant.
In the 1972 case, United States v. U.S. District Court, the Supreme Court held that it was indeed legal for the government to use
electronic surveillance on United States citizens so long as there
was some sort of threat to domestic security.12 This ruling established a clear legal sanction for wiretapping under certain conditions, but provided no specific criteria for those conditions nor did it
enumerate the proper procedures that should be undertaken. Much
of this ambiguity was cleared up in the 1978 Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) which established specific guidelines for
how the government could utilize electronic surveillance. Most notably, FISA included a provision that allowed the President to authorize electronic surveillance without a court order, for the period of
one year, only if used to acquire foreign intelligence information.13
This not only provided a legal standard for international electronic
intelligence gathering, but also set a precedent for similar surveillance to take place within the United States. When Congress passed
the Patriot Act in 2001, they essentially “tore down ‘the wall’ between foreign intelligence and criminal law enforcement”.14 One of
the Patriot Act’s provisions allowed for information to move more
easily between different government entities. Also, where FISA had
11
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strictly limited the use of covert electronic surveillance, the Patriot
Act only required that the government have a “significant purpose,”
before obtaining the necessary judicial approval.15 This leniency allowed the Executive to use electronic surveillance more liberally and
more frequently, in part because the Executive itself could decide
what constituted a “significant purpose.” As a result, one of the major controversies over the Patriot Act involves the exact definition of
a “significant purpose” and whether or not the Executive adheres to
that definition.
Despite the controversy surrounding the Patriot Act, it has been
renewed repeatedly, with several of the more controversial sections
left intact. In February of 2010, President Obama signed a bill to
extend three of these “controversial” provisions found in the act
for one year: conducting court-approved roving wiretaps, seizing
records and property during operations against terrorism, and conducting surveillance on “lone-wolf” entities or individuals involved
in terrorism who are not affiliated with a recognized terrorist group.
Recently, in May of 2011 President Obama signed another bill, extending the same provisions for an additional four years.16
The changes made to the Patriot Act thus far have attempted to
limit individual rights as little as possible while still facilitating the
government’s ability to maintain national security, and many controversies have been resolved. However, the Patriot Act is still not perfect, nor should it cease to be improved. One possible improvement
would be to increase the executive’s accountability to other branches
of government by instituting a committee to periodically review the
Executive’s use of electronic surveillance. This would enhance the
Patriot Act’s consistency with constitutional checks and balances,
and help to regulate the balance of safeguarding the nation and protecting the rights of its citizens.

15
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II. Controversies Surrounding the Patriot Act
The Patriot Act has sparked and sustained a wide variety of controversies. Many of these controversies have been centered around
specific sections and provisions of the Patriot Act, some of which
have been amended whereas others have remained in place.
One such section is Section 215, which “authorizes the government to obtain ‘any tangible thing’ relevant to a terrorism
investigation.”17 Some of the controversy surrounding this section
stems from exaggeration and misinterpretation. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) claims that this section authorizes the government to do so “even if there is no showing that the “thing” pertains to suspected terrorists or terrorist activities.”18 However, this
contradicts the actual wording of the Patriot Act. Specific justification may not be made public, but that does not mean that it has not
been shown and approved. Admittedly, it is difficult for the public
to know whether the Executive is following proper procedures, but
by implementing a committee to review the Executive’s use of electronic surveillance, the public would be assured that the Executive
was checked by an outside source.
Another controversial section allows for “roving wiretaps,”
meaning that the government may employ electronic surveillance on
“a foreign power or agent of a foreign power” as opposed to being required to explicitly list each of the individuals involved.19 The ACLU
argues against this section, because it “permits the government to
obtain intelligence surveillance orders that identify neither the person nor the facility to be tapped” and does not require the government “to state with particularity what it seeks to search or seize.”20
While this is indeed what this section does, the ACLU has yet to
17
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offer a preferable alternative. Furthermore, individuals who are in
communication with known terrorist groups have chosen to associate themselves with that group, and obtaining warrants for each
individual within such a group is a dangerous and needless waste of
resources.
Although in a limited government, such as in the United States,
the Executive must be checked by other branches, it must retain
some autonomy. Otherwise it cannot effectively make decisive decisions during a time of crisis. It must also be remembered that the
Executive cannot disclose certain aspects of its decision-making to
the public due to security concerns. This is a fundamental difficulty
when assessing the validity of the Executive’s decisions to override
the requirement of a court warrant. Much of the information that
contributes to the Executive’s decision to exercise special powers is
strictly classified. If terrorists and other criminals are to be apprehended, every effort must be made to prevent them from knowing
the government’s methods and sources for acquiring information.
Other information cannot be disclosed because its general knowledge could jeopardize the safety of the individuals who obtain it and
potentially the nation as a whole. However, if a review committee
were to be appointed, no such decisions would be left for the executive to make alone. They would still be able to act with a certain
level of autonomy (at least initially) but they would do so knowing
that they would be held accountable for all decisions at a future date.

III. Implementation of an Electronic Surveillance Review
Committee
As has been discussed, much of the controversy surrounding the
Patriot Act revolves around the concern that it enables the Executive to act without accountability. This has been a particular concern with regard to instances where it is expedient to circumvent
traditional procedures for obtaining a warrant prior to the use of
electronic surveillance. While the provisions of the Patriot Act that
pertain to the authorization of electronic surveillance are presently
constitutional, it would be beneficial for the Executive to be more
accountable for such surveillance. If Congress formed a review com-
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mittee that periodically evaluated the Executive’s use of electronic
surveillance, any valid concerns over the Executive’s accountability
would be eliminated.
It is not entirely without precedent for a review committee to so
closely scrutinize the actions of government entities that have significant investigative privileges. In fact, the investigations and intelligence operations of the FBI are reviewed by nine separate review
committees to ensure that the Bureau is not infringing upon any
civil liberties or privacy rights.21 Since the Patriot Act grants the
Executive similar investigative powers, it is logical that it should be
subject to similar review. This would reduce concern over the Executive’s authority and help to improve the Patriot Act so as to more
fully ensure civil liberties.
This review committee would, by necessity, consist of members
outside of the Executive Branch. This would ensure that the committee remains insulated from the Executive and allow the committee to
provide an efficient check upon the Executive’s authority. It is even
possible that the function of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, which is to approve the Executive’s requests for warrants,
could be expanded to encompass the responsibilities of this review
committee.22 If this Court were used, the review committee would
be separate from the Executive and even its selection would be insulated, because the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is selected by the Chief Justice and composed of members of the Judicial
Branch. If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were unable
to perform this additional function, then a committee could be assembled from other members of the Judiciary or Congress. If such
were the case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court would be
in a good position to appoint the members of this special review
committee, because of its unique function and its isolation from other
branches of government.
With such a committee in place, even if the need for decisiveness
required the Executive to bypass them initially, it would be with the
21
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knowledge that it would soon be required to disclose and justify its
actions to that same court. The creation of this committee would
substantially increase the accountability of the Executive, while
still allowing the Executive some level of autonomy. The Executive
would retain the freedom to investigate terrorist threats immediately, but would be tempered by the knowledge that it must answer for
all such action.
In order for such a committee to be effective, it would also be
granted the power to punish any culpable member of the Executive
branch and, if necessary, impeach the President. As only two U.S.
Presidents have ever been impeached, such an action would be an
extremely dramatic public event with lasting consequences. While it
is true that neither of the two Presidents who have been impeached
were removed from office, the possibility of such a removal still exists. Also, even if a President were impeached and later acquitted, it
is certain that the public’s opinion of the President would suffer and
likely that it would be devastated. Considering such ramifications,
granting this review committee power to impeach the President, if
necessary, would likely be adequate to deter the Executive from improperly abridging civil liberties. It is hoped that such power would
never need to be exercised, but would simply act as a deterrent. However, if the need ever arose, this committee would be capable of holding the Executive responsible for any unlawful invasion of privacy.
As this committee would primarily fall under the Judicial Branch,
its power would be limited to penalizing any unlawful action discovered during periodic review sessions. In this way, although the
committee would have substantial power to check the president, its
actions would also be checked.
This committee would further eliminate controversy by increasing the transparency of the Executive’s actions, even if only
to a closed review committee. The extent of the Executive’s powers
might be disconcerting to some, particularly when such powers interfere with an individual’s right to privacy. However, it is far more
disconcerting to think that the Executive may employ those powers
entirely in secret. If the Executive is permitted to act independent
of all other entities, no one can be entirely certain of what it does.
It is in such a situation, that the abuse of power is most likely to oc-
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cur. With greater transparency and thus greater accountability, any
government entity will be more likely to act in accordance with the
law. Furthermore, even when abuse is in truth absent, a greater level
of transparency assures the public that abuse is indeed absent. The
institution of a review committee to oversee the Executive’s use of
electronic surveillance would achieve this.

IV. Conclusion
The Patriot Act has been shown to be constitutional in spite of
many of the controversies that have surrounded it. However, the implementation of a committee to review the Executive’s unwarranted
electronic surveillance would not only help to dispel many of the
controversies that surround the Patriot Act, but could also improve
the lawful execution of many of the provisions found within the Patriot Act. Such a committee would help to ensure that civil liberties
would not be unduly limited, while still allowing the Executive the
power to ensure national security.
According to the parameters set forth by the Constitution and
various congressional acts, electronic surveillance is legal, provided that proper procedures are followed. It is not the most favorable
means to acquire information, but in certain circumstances it is the
only means to gather the information that is essential to the preservation of national security. There have been instances of unwarranted wiretapping and the Executive has admitted to the use of such
presumably illegal surveillance. However this is also legal if there
is a strong enough national risk. The need for the Patriot Act is certainly unfortunate, but it is nevertheless ever present.
As stated by Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid, “The raid
that killed Osama bin Laden also yielded an enormous amount of
new information that has spurred dozens of investigations yielding
new leads every day. Without the Patriot Act, investigators would
not have the tools they need to follow these new leads and disrupt
terrorist plots, needlessly putting our national security at risk”. The
Patriot Act is an effective weapon against terrorism, but can be improved upon to ensure that the Executive does not abuse its powers. By implementing a review committee as has been described,
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both national security and individual rights can be upheld. With this
change, the people of the United States will be able to feel more secure, both in safety and in freedom.

We the People, in Order to Form a More
Perfect Union: A Look at Organic Law as
Foundation for Corporate Restrictions in
Politics
Jonathon Green1

I

n 2010, the Hart Research Associates tracked the sentiments of
the American people in regards to corporate influence on politics. Of those surveyed, eighty-five percent expressed that corporations have too much influence on politics, and ninety-three percent
felt that the average citizen holds too little influence.2 The results of
this study indicate that the public feels that they are being marginalized and not being heard in Washington.
A few months prior to the Hart Research study, the Supreme
Court ruled on the cases Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee (FEC) and Speechnow.org v. FEC. These rulings allowed for
corporations and individuals to donate unlimited funds to political
organizations.3 While it is still too early to see the full implications
of these two rulings, the Court’s move has generated a significant reaction in the media. In their ruling, the Court reasoned that because
corporations are recognized under the law as persons, they also were
1
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guaranteed protection and rights equal to those enjoyed by human
persons, as found in the Declaration of Independence.4 By doing so,
the Supreme Court overturned one hundred years of restrictions on
corporate donations to political causes—precedent established to
protect the interests of the American people. One hundred forty-six
years prior to this ruling, Abraham Lincoln issued a warning about
the power of corporations that seems appropriate to remember in the
country’s current political climate:
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me
and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. Corporations
have been enthroned, an era of corruption in high places will follow,
and the money-power of the country will endeavor to prolong its
reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until the wealth
is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed.5
While Lincoln’s words may be extreme, the core message possesses a valuable warning: the inclusion of corporations in the political arena increases the threat of corruption in politics. To determine
the accuracy of this warning, there should be strict scrutiny over
the next several election cycles to determine whether corruption has
increased with the addition of corporate donations. One way to view
the effects of this would be a game theory analysis between corporations and politicians, to see if potential outcomes of actions lead to
results that are not in the best interests of the public. If this were to
prove the case, then the argument that corporations are not citizens
of the American society would potentially allow the Court to reverse
their decision in Citizens United, and follow the dissenting opinion.

I. History of Corporations as Persons
In 1907 Congress passed the Tillman Act. The Tillman Act
was the first piece of legislation prohibiting corporate donations to
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national political campaigns.6 Senator Benjamin Tillman of South
Carolina sponsored the bill after President Roosevelt called for the
prohibition of corporate contributions. Roosevelt’s actions were in
response to allegations that various corporations were blackmailing
politicians to vote in certain ways, according to an article in The
New York Times on June 17, 1906.7
The implications of the Tillman act were obfuscated with Supreme Court rulings over the twentieth century. Furthermore, the
current situation is the culmination of prior rulings spanning two
centuries. Since 1818, the Supreme Court has determined over
various rulings that corporations are effectively “persons” under
the Constitution, who have rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.8 Furthermore, the ruling of Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
determined that money is a form of speech, which granted a certain
level of protection to political contributions under the First Amendment.9 In the 2010 case Citizens United v. FEC, corporations were
granted the legal right to donate to political causes because they are
persons.10 This ruling is based upon the inalienable right of a person
to exercise free speech under the First Amendment, and invalidated
more than a century of legislation, providing the final blow in a multistep erosion of the precautions established by the Tillman Act.11
A corporation is a body formed and authorized by law to act
as a single person although constituted by one or more persons. It
is legally endowed by the government with various rights and du6

Roger Berkowitz, A Brief History of Campaign Finance, Hannah Arendt
Center (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?tag=tillmanact.

7

The Complete Speeches and Addresses of Theodore Roosevelt, Almanac of Theodore Roosevelt, http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/
trspeechescomplete.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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Trs. Of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); see also Clay
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of Am. Civil Liberties (Paul Finkelman ed., CRC Press 2006).
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ties, including the capacity for succession.12 Prior to forming a corporation, the founder must file the Articles of Incorporation. These
are defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “a governing document
that sets forth the basic terms of a corporation’s existence, including the number and classes of shares and the purposes and duration
of the corporation. In most states, the articles of incorporation are
filed with the secretary of state as part of the process of forming the
corporation.”13
During the filing process, a corporation must designate their
purposes for incorporation. These purposes fall into one of two main
categories: corporations that are aimed at profit maximization via
selling of goods and services, and those that are determined as nonprofit. Non-profit corporations include Political Action Committees
(PACs), SuperPACs, and various other entities.14

II. Status Quo
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in the Citizens United case stating:
There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political
speech context, the government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers. The government may regulate
corporate speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.15
This ruling upholds the sanctity of the First Amendment, in the
opinion of the majority ruling. By allowing corporations to donate
without restriction, the Court merely extended the legal fiction of
corporations as people. This action appears to be directly in line
with the precedent stretching back to the original case when corpo12

Corporation Definition, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/corporation (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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rations were defined as “persons,” Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.16 If corporate personhood is sufficiently similar to human personhood, then this gradual allocation of rights was and is a
logical progression.
This is the principle with which the dissenting opinion, as written by Justice John Paul Stevens, takes issue. He wrote:
The notion that the First Amendment dictated [today’s ruling] is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. In the context of election to public office, the distinction between
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they
make enormous contributions to our society, corporations
are not actually members of it.17
Stevens’ argument is about whether corporations should be considered in the same context as people in regards to First Amendment rights. He argues that the case should not have been decided
on grounds that corporations are speakers and therefore endowed
with the right to that speech. Rather, Justice Stevens argues that the
context of the speech of corporations in respects to election to public
office is sufficiently different from that of human persons to warrant
additional restrictions on corporations. Continuing in his statement,
he concludes that this difference is the capacity of an individual to
participate as a member of society.
One measure of a corporation’s capacity to participate in society,
and thereby constitute a member thereof, would be to see how the
rules and consequences of regulation in that society affect a corporation. If they are equally in effect for corporations and people, then it
is a sound conclusion that corporations are people in society.
Consider the First Amendment: Congress shall not abridge the
freedom of speech. Ignoring the money-speech debate, it is possible
to infringe this right for human persons by denying them a voice
in public matters, just as it is possible to prevent corporations from
16
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having a “voice” in public matters. In this it appears that a corporation can incur the same injustice as a human. However, the Court
has ruled in limited cases that when it is in the interest of public
safety, human persons do not have the right to free speech.18 Such
exceptions include slander, obscenity, fighting words, and more. If
humans may be limited in their First Amendment rights, albeit under narrowly defined circumstances, then corporations too could be
subjected to similar restriction.
Next, regarding the Second Amendment, if a well-regulated militia is essential, and the people possess the right to bear arms, then
how is this right expressed in a corporation? Does a corporation bear
the right to raise an armed and well-regulated militia? There are corporations that do so, namely entitled as Private Military Companies
(PMC). These firms contract security services, domestically and
abroad. Whether or not this is equated with a person’s right to own a
firearm or to raise a militia with intent of self-defense is debatable. It
is important to note that in order to form a corporation with the intent of acting as a PMC, one needs to obtain approval from the State
Department, for licensing as well as for every contract negotiation.19
This qualification appears to distinguish corporate rights from human citizens’ Second Amendment rights. Yet the counterargument
exists that people have similar restrictions in place for the obtaining
of select firearms, namely fully automatic weaponry.20
With the Fifth Amendment, the question arises of whether a
corporation is deemed equal to a person when it is denied the right
against self-incrimination. The Court has ruled multiple times denying corporations the Fifth Amendment, starting with Hale v. Henkel
(1906) and continuing through to the most recent case of Federal

18

Henry Cohen, Cong. Research Serv., 95-815, Freedom of Speech and
Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment (2009).
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Laura Peterson, Privatizing Combat: The New World Order, Ctr. for
Pub. Integrity (Aug. 10, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.
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Communications Commission V. AT&T Inc. (2011). 21 Human persons
are not obligated to self-incriminate when on trial, but the Court
has unilaterally denied this right to corporations, forcing them to
produce incriminating documents when under subpoena. The difference between the two is that the possible punishments are not equitable between human persons and corporations. If people incriminate
themselves, they risk imprisonment and/or fines. A corporation cannot be imprisoned, and therefore is not on the same terms as a human
person in respects to this right. This is a similar discrepancy to the
one that Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion for the Citizens United case.
Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment states, “The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States.”22 Heretofore, corporations have not been granted the
right to vote. Either corporations are not citizens and not guaranteed
the same rights as citizens, or the current system is unlawfully barring corporations from voting in elections. It is this element of citizenry that provides support to the argument that corporations can be
viewed differently under the law.
In truth, many amendments offer challenges when attempting
to view corporate roles in society. This would appear to support the
argument that Justice Stevens offered in the dissenting opinion that
corporations’ societal position warrants barring them from a voice
in the electoral process. Furthermore, because the Court split five
to four in the case in question, there is strong evidence that Justice
Stevens is not alone in his views and that the government would not
be overstepping its bounds by regulating certain corporate rights,
like free speech.

21
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III. Game Theory
Since the ruling on Citizens United, there have only been one
presidential and two congressional elections. This limits the amount
of time available for empirical analysis to be successful in determining the effects, positive or negative, of allowing corporations to
donate to politicians and political groups. However, if the motives
behind political donations of people differ from the motives of corporations there is valuable insight into forecasting behavior based
upon those motivations.
People rationally donate primarily to one side or the other of
a political issue, namely the side that most accurately represents
their personal viewpoints. Corporations do not mimic this pattern
of behavior as shown in this report from the Huffington Post examining the ten largest corporate political contributors. The majority
of corporations have approached political donations with the same
strategy that they would pursue investment portfolios—namely diversification. Seven of the ten largest contributing corporations donated roughly 60-40 to one party or the other. The remaining three
donated either one hundred percent or ninety-nine percent to only
a single candidate, namely the Huntsman Corporation via chairman Jon Huntsman Sr. to Jon Huntsman Jr.’s campaign and related
SuperPacs, Las Vegas Sands Corp. donating to Newt Gingrich’s
campaign and associated SuperPacs with ninety-five percent of the
eleven million dollars coming directly from CEO Sheldon Adelson,
and DreamWorks to the Democratic Party and the SuperPacs that
primarily support them.23
These examples support in large part the assumption that corporations differ in practice from people in their political contributions.
One way to analyze the future impacts and repercussions of this behavior is to utilize economic Game Theory. This branch in economics is known as an effective tool in analyzing potential outcomes for
interactions between parties. Through the use of simplification of
23
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real world situations, Game Theory provides a valuable insight for
why parties choose to act based on a matrix of potential outcomes.
To set up this model, we’ll begin with two participants: politicians and corporations. Each participant has a set of actions, and depending upon the actions of the other participant, they each receive
an outcome. Consider the following game matrix:

Politician
Favor			

Not Favor

Donate

(δα-β)+pz, β+pz

-β+pz, β+pz

Not Donate

δα+pz, +pz

0,0

Corporation

In this game δ represents the probability that the firm will receive a political favor and is a positively correlated function of β. β
is the corporation’s donation and also the politician’s benefit, and α
represents the benefit to the corporation from a political favor. The
variable z represents the fine for wrongful favors or bribery, and is
based upon the probability of discovery, p, and is a number between
0 and 1. This is also a two-stage game, meaning that the corporation goes first with Donate or Not Donate, and then the politician
responds by either Favor or Not Favor. While the matrix only shows
the payoffs for the first round of the game, the game can be to have
the same payoffs for any number of rounds, alternating between the
two players.
When playing out this game, the outcome, or equilibrium, is
found depending on certain conditions. As p approaches zero, the
likelihood of discovery also goes to zero, meaning that there are
essentially no repercussions to deter the corporation and politician
from improper behavior. Furthermore, for the corporation to always
donate, the term needs to be sufficiently related to the value of the
donation such that the corporation would have an optimal β value at
which the gains from α are sufficient to outweigh all potential costs
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and fines. Also, if the β term is high enough from the politician’s
perspective to outweigh the consequences of pz, then the politician
will be best motivated to favor the corporation. These conditions
lead to two equilibrium outcomes, either (Donate, Favor) or (Not
Donate, Not Favor). The first situation will always be the outcome
if the politician values future donations, thereby being motivated to
continue favoring the corporation rather than gain a onetime benefit.
The second outcome would be the equilibrium if the β donation is
too expensive to the firm with a low probability of return; also, if the
likelihood of discovery and fines were high enough, neither party
would be motivated to act improperly. This places a large burden
on the process for rigorous scrutiny. From a societal perception the
(Donate, Favor) outcome is potentially detrimental. This loss could
be translated into loss of influence in politics, feelings of marginalization, as well as policies being enacted that are in the best interests
of corporations to the detriment of persons in society.
This theoretical extension would conclude an end outcome of
either a society which is unable to properly oversee impropriety and
corruption leading to a corrupt outcome, or it results in a society
that properly regulates and dis-incentivizes collusion and corruption. In the latter of the two, without the ability to sway a politician,
the corporation has no motivation to donate—whether it is legal or
not. In the former situation, society becomes subject to the preferences of the corporation, essentially losing its voice in the political
process. To translate this back into the real world, this game would
suggest careful attention to the donating behaviors of corporations
in future election cycles. This would either help justify the Court’s
ruling to allow them to donate, as politicians maintain the public
interests despite corporate influence as reflected by declining corporate donation values, or it would signal a warning that corporations
are deriving unjust benefits via ever increasing donations.

IV. Separating and Defining Corporate Rights
In the Citizens United case, the winning argument focused on
the injustice of restricting all corporations from political involvement, when media corporations were allowed nearly unfettered
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political involvement.24 This line of reasoning relies heavily on
equating money-speech with the speech found in newspapers, journals, news broadcasts, etc. Since media corporations were exempt
from the Tillman Act, proponents of the aforementioned cases argued that all corporations should be exempt. In other words, the Tillman Act was argued to be unconstitutional. The Court agreed.25 Yet,
it is important to note that the focus of this argument is weakened by
the explicit protection of the First Amendment to “the press.” This
would grant the media relief from the Tillman Act through the direct
language of the First Amendment.
When dealing with political speech, there is a potential benefit
to distinguishing between corporations and other interest groups. By
limiting corporate involvement in politics, Congress would diminish the potential for governmental corruption. Delineation between
corporations that were incorporated with the purpose of expressing
political thought from those that were incorporated with the primary
intent to maximize wealth would provide a sensible method of distinguishing which types of corporations could be allowed to donate
to political causes. Congress could enact a law allowing for political
speech and contributions from certain corporations and not others,
using the distinction of wealth maximizing or non-profit as defined
above. The value to this is that through a non-profit organization’s
reliance on donations themselves, the organization is a better representation of public voice. This would make the volume of an organization’s voice dependent on the voices of real people, rather than a
factor of economic booms and profit margins.

V. Conclusion
Clear language detailing the exact rights granted to corporations
is permissible, and even desirable in the United States. This is supported by a careful analysis of the risks and benefits of unlimited
corporate donations in politics. These effects are spread across society,
24
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as seen through economic forecasting of political behavior. It appears that the ramifications of Citizens United will have an overall
negative effect on society. Therefore, it would be prudent to curtail the harmful consequences of the ruling. In order to do this efficiently, the high-risk factors for corruption and societal detriment
should be observed carefully over the next several political cycles. In
the event that the ruling does prove to be detrimental, the Supreme
Court should consider limiting the rights of corporate persons. This
action would be fully justified in the law under Justice Steven’s argument that while corporations are protected as persons in some aspects of the law, by not being actual members of society other facets
are not applicable or should be denied them for the protection of
human persons in society.
With this style of reform, those groups who were chartered to
specifically engage in political discussion would still be granted the
right to political free speech, fulfilling the purpose of their incorporation. At the same time, the government would be able to more easily control the effects of corporations on politics and society.

